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Introduction
This thesis divides into four parts. The first chapter intro-
duces my part of contribution to economic theory. I describe
and motivate the questions that this branch in general aims
to give answers to and those questions that I ask in the chap-
ters that follow. I present the methodology I apply and the
results I obtain. I close the first part by relating my contribu-
tions to the literature. The remaining three chapters contain
my contributions that are all selfcontained and independent,
but connected by the same evolutionary perspective.
I.1 Game Theory
The subject of this thesis is Evolutionary Game Theory,
which is a section of Game Theory. To give a brief intro-
duction to the theory of games I describe the methodology
and motivate the questions to which a response can be re-
vealed by game theory.
A game is a setting in which several agents strategically in-
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teract. An agent represents an economic or social entity that
takes decisions, balances reasons for distinct alternatives, or
calculates the risk of accepting or rejecting an offer. An en-
tity can differ with respect to the abstraction of the model
under consideration: in one setting, the agent can represent
a firm, which competes with other firms – the agent then
seeks to maximize the profits of the firm given the output-,
quality- or price-choices of the other firms. In a different set-
ting, the agent may represent a firm’s manager has to decide
on the level of efforts to exert, given a known reward scheme
and the choices of his colleagues. In a completely different
setting, an agent can represent an individual who attaches a
value to the completion of a public project – as for example a
bridge. The agent has to determine the amount of money she
is willing to pay for that bridge, given that she knows other
individuals who also would value the bridge. For any setting,
the game theorist specifies the relevant and plausible level of
aggregation and defines the set of decision taking entities:
the players. In terms of game theory, the alternative op-
tions among the player can choose is called the set of strate-
gies. Several players strategically interact, if their choices
have joint consequences: when evaluating, which strategy to
choose, a player has to consider the strategies chosen by other
players, because they also are relevant for the consequence.
A complete description of a game in normal- or strategic
form consists of the set of players, the set of their strate-
gies and a representation of the players’ preferences over the
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set of consequences. It is a common assumption, that the
preferences satisfy three standard axioms1 and hereby can
be represented by a utility function that assigns a real num-
ber to each possible tupel of strategies for each player. The
preferences, and therefore the utility functions of the players
derive from some plausible economic or social interpretation
of the situation that is to be modelled. However, game the-
oretic methodology does not require that these preferences
relfect or neglect particular emotions or ways of thinking, as
selfishness or altruism, spite or goodwill, as long as the pref-
erences satisfy the three beforementioned axioms. However,
given the preferences, the concept of game theory requires
different degrees of rationality of the agents. Before describ-
ing the methodology of game theory and the questions that
game theory can respond to, I mention games in extensive
form. If a player knows the strategic decision of some other
players before she takes her own decision, the game exhibits
a sequential structure. Games with and without sequential
structure can yield strongly diverse predictions. My thesis is
focussed on simultaneous decisions.
Suppose agents choose the optimal strategy given their in-
formation on the strategy choice of all other players. A game
theorist calls such an agent rational. A further assumption is
that each agent knows that all other agents are rational, and
1The three axioms are Completeness (x  y ∨ y  x ∀x, y ∈ X),
Reflexivity (x  x ∀x ∈ X) and Transitivity (x  y, y  z ⇒ x 
z ∀x, y, z ∈ X).
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that each other agent knows that all other agents know that
the other agents are rational – and so on. This informational
structure is referred to as common knowledge of rationality
(Aumann (1976)). Given a game in normal form, game the-
ory asks “given that each player chooses a particular strat-
egy, does any player have an incentive to deviate from her
decision?” A tupel of strategies in which each player is con-
fident with the selected decision is called Nash-equilibrium.
This is a situation in which a game theorist expects that
the economic entities maintain the selected alternatives. If
agents have access to randomized strategies, a Nash equilib-
rium exists for any finite game in normal form.2 Moreover, a
question of interest concerns stability: at a given equilibrium,
do the players support this equilibrium, if they expect other
players to make an error with small probability? Do play-
ers persist to the equilibrium, if the expected consequences
are slightly different? Implicetely, to solve these problems,
even more rationality is imposed on the players. It is as-
sumed that players sophisticatedly form their expectations
(on the strategical choice of the co-players) on the result-
ing consequences. These and other questions led to a vari-
ety of equilibrium refinements,3 each imposing assumptions
upon the rationality of the players of different quality. Evo-
2‘Finite’ refers to the number of (pure, or deterministic) strategies
available to each player.
3An excellent compendium is van Damme (1991).
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lutionary Game Theory, which is introduced in the following
section, adresses whether certain situations are stable. How-
ever, unlike in the literature on equilibrium refinement, the
requirements on the rationality of the agents are drastically
reduced. The contribution of this approach results in: Even
if agents are extremely boundedly rational, some outcomes
that would be predicted by models of rational agents display
stability properties.
The next section defines what is meant by extreme
bounded rationality.
I.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
Methods of game theory have also been applied to promote
the analysis of animal conflicts. An intensively discussed
setting is that of the Hawk-Dove-Game. In a population of
two species, a large number individuals compete for a scarce
resource: breeding area. One species, the dove, acts coopera-
tively and shares the available area with other entities of the
population. The other species, the hawk, is aggressive and
fights for its territory. This situation is modelled as follows:
at each point in time two exemplars of the population are
selected at random. The probability of one exemplar being a
member of a particular species is proportional to the number
of its members in the population. Each of the two exemplars
are drawn independently. The pair can either consist of two
doves, two hawks or one dove and one hawk. If two doves
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meet, they share resources and each individual enjoys half
of its value. If two hawks encounter, they fight and subse-
quently one of them conquere the full resource but has to
bear costs in terms of energy and time. If a hawk and a dove
meet, the dove immediately withdraws and the hawk enjoys
the full resource without bearing costs. The value of the ac-
quired resources balanced by the cost of fighting is employed
to produce offsprings. In this model, the type of the species
is referred to as a strategy and the consequence is identified
with a number that represents the number of produced off-
springs. This number is also called fitness. In the biological
context, each individual is a member of a particular species
that fully prescribes the behavior of that individual. The
individual does not “choose” a particular strategy but be-
haves exactly as its parents and it produces offsprings that
behave in exactly the same manner as the parents. A species
that is successful, has a high fitness (produces a high number
of offspring) and the subpopulation of the members of that
species grows. For game theory, relative statements are of
interest. Therefore the model captures only relative sizes:
a species that is relatively successful shows a relative high
fitness and the representation of that species grows within
the entire population. Methodoligically, the growth of each
species is captured by a differential equation. If the number
of offspring is proportional to the fitness, the relative growth
rate of a particular species is linear and equals the difference
of its fitness and the average fitness of the population. In this
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case, the differential equation is termed replicator equation.
Given this apparatus, game theorists analyze rest points of
this dynamic and their stability properties (see section I.4
for a discussion). To provide a conclusion, all Nash-equilibria
are rest points of the replicator dynamic and all interior rest-
points of the replicator dynamic are Nash-equilibria. Evo-
lutionary game theory can hereby contribute to economics:
even if interacting agents are extremely boundedly rational,
an outcome that would remain unchanged if agents were ra-
tional, remains unchanged. Proceeding to stability issues,
the analogy continues: In asymmetric settings, an outcome
that is stable with respect to the replicator dynamics is also
stable for rational agents in the sense that a vast variety of
equilibrium refinements would predict that outcome.
How does a concept of animal behavior in which ‘choices’
or ‘strategic interaction’ are omitted, provide a plausible
foundation to analyze economic or social problems? Dawkins
(1990, chap. 11) illuminates the parallels between genetic
and cultural transmission. To illustrate this parallel, he
refers to language: “Language seems to ‘evolve’ by non-
genetic means, and at a rate which is orders of magnitudes
faster than genetic evolution.” (p.189) Obviously, language is
not inherited. Children learn a language from their parents
by imitation. Dawkins calls the cultural replicator, the ‘unit
of cultural transmission’ a meme, that underlies the same
logic of spreading within a population as a gene.
“Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-
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phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or
of building arches. Just as genes propagate them-
selves in the gene pool by leaping from body to
body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from
brain to brain via a process which, in the broad
sense, can be called imitation.” (Dawkins (1990,
chap. 11, p. 192))
Of course, biological evolution cannot provide a suitable
explanation for the change of human behavior, simply
because the genome essentially remains unmodified within
one lifespan. But, in concert with the abovementioned
interpretation, the mechanics of evolution is helpful tp
develop models in which agents learn by imitation (see
section I.4).
A concept, that is common among almost all pa-
pers on evolution in game theoryis described by Selten
(1991) (p. 21) as follows:
“We have identified a hierarchy of dynamic
processes which shape economic behavior. I
name these processes in the order of increasing
speed:
1. (the slowest process) gene substition by
mutation,
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2. adaptation of genotype frequencies without
mutation,
3. cultural transmission from generation to
generation,
4. learning (including imitation).
The speed differences are so great that for
many purposes an adiabatic approximation
seems to be justified. Adiabatic approximation
means that if we look at one of the four pro-
cesses, results of lower processes can be taken as
fixed and quicker processes can be assumed to
reach equilibrium instantly.”
In this thesis, two main types of processes are distinguished
that roughly correspond to numbers 1. and 4. in the list
above. One type of process, models the selection of strategic
choice and is based on the payoffs of the game. A process of
this type includes the classes of best- or better-reply dynam-
ics as well as imitation dynamics and others. All processes of
this type are subsumed as selection processes (see next sec-
tion). The second process type models ‘mistakes’ or ‘errors’
– in economic language (or ‘mutations’ with a biological in-
terpretation) – and is assumed to be completely independent
of the underlying payoffs. The first type of processes incor-
porates all factors that affect strategic choice, processes of
the second type are defined by residual factors that are ex-
ogenous to the model. I regard the second type to be slower
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than the selection process and analyse the extreme case in
which it is infinitely slower. I study dynamical systems that
– depending on the model under consideration – are defined
on a continuous or discrete state space with continuous or
discrete time.
I.3 Literature on Stochastic Stabil-
ity
Freidlin and Wentzell (1998)4 developed methods that have
been applied in dynamic game theoretic models of imitation,
best response-behavior and local interaction. They specify a
Markov chain that is disturbed by a noise term and derive
results for the limit case when the noise vanishes. Although
Freidlin and Wentzell (1998) analyse stochastic differential
equations defined on continuous phase spaces, they specify
a discrete concept of resistance minimizing graphs which are
defined on a finite index set, each index representing one ab-
sorbing subset of the continuous phase space. Hereby, their
method can conveniently be applied to models with discrete
state spaces. Foster and Young (1990) who introduced these
methods into game theory. Their definition of stochastic
4The seminal work originally cited in the literature is the book pub-
lished in 1984 of which I cite the second edition. I gained also very much
from Karlin and Taylor (1975) as an excellent reference for stochastic
processes.
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stability is widely accepted: A state (which can represent
a tupel of strategies or a distribution of strategies within
a population) is stochastically stable, if it receives positive
probability under the limiting invariant distribution. The
limiting invariant distribution is the long run distribution
of the perturbed Markov process as the perturbation van-
ishes to zero. The limiting invariant distribution has two
interpretations: i) as time goes to infinity, the density on
a state is proportional to the share of the time the process
spends in the state, and ii) if one stops the process in the
far future, the limiting invariant distribution specifies the
probability with which the process is in a particular state.
The contribution of Foster and Young (1990) to economics
is that the number of invariant distributions is reduced to
one, if one considers perturbed processes and that even ar-
bitrary small stochastic effects may qualitatively change the
asymptotic behavior of the system. This methodology was
taken up by Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993) and Elli-
son (1993). Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) study
best-response dynamics and show that in 2× 2-coordination
games, only the risk dominant Nash-equilibrium (Harsanyi
and Selten (1988)) is stochastically stable. The underlying
criteria of stochastic stability can be critizised for various
reasons. One criterium is that the process must be active
for a very long time. If evolution is slow, the implications
of stochastic stability may be uninteresting for settings in
which agents interact, who have a finite lifespan. From this
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point of departure, Ellison (1993) focuses on the speed of
convergence of such Markov processes and shows that evo-
lution is fast (and therefore relevant for economic and social
applications), if interaction is local. Another point of criti-
cism is the model of mutations, that defines the perturbed
process. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that if the model
of mutations is not chosen appropriately, any state can be
implemented to be stochastically stable. They identify a
necessary condition for a non-arbitrary selection as the fol-
lowing: for any two states, the ratio of the probabilities of a
mutation, mistake or error, must have an upper bound as the
perturbation goes to zero. This means that the probability of
a mutation given a particular state must be of the same order
of magnitude for all states. The fact that events with very
low probability, in fact arbitrary improbable events, play a
crucial role for determining stochastic stability is the point
of critique implicetly put forward in Binmore and Samuelson
(1994) or Samuelson (1997). Suppose that the unperturbed
process has two absorbing sets A and B. If the perturbed
process transits from B to A, if n ∈ N mutations occur and
from A to B, if n + 1 mutations occur, the set A is stochas-
tically stable. In the limit, as the probability of a mutation
goes to zero, the probability of the transit from A to B is in-
finitely smaller than the probability of the reverse transit. It
may be difficult to provide a plausible economic explanation
why A is stable and B is not, if n is a large number. Binmore
and Samuelson (1994) propose to consider recurrent sets that
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consist of a collection of absorbing sets of the unperturbed
process that have overlapping ‘one mutation neighborhoods’.
A one mutation neighborhood of a state x is the subset of
all states that can be reached from x if one mutation occurs.
Binmore and Samuelson (1994) coin the term drift as the
movement between two different absorbing sets that are ad-
jacent in the sense that one mutation can cause the process
to transit from one absorbing set to the other.
I.4 Literature on Evolutionary Se-
lection Dynamics
A selection dynamic specifies which kind of behavior or
strategy-choice spreads in a population of many agents. Se-
lection dynamics differ with respect to various criteria. One
important distinction is
Individual versus Group Selection. The representa-
tive model of group selection is the hay stack model (May-
nard Smith (1964)). Translated to economic terms, the hay
stack model is a setting in which economic agents are ar-
ranged in groups. Interaction is possible only within a group,
there is no inter-group activity. For a long period of time,
selection of relative successful behavior takes place in each
group. The avarage success of each group determines its
weight in the total population. Once in a while a randomly
chosen group creates an exact copy, where the each group
is chosen with probability equal to its weight in the total
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population.5 In his comparison of models of individual- and
group selection, Bergstrom (2002) points out the importance
of non-assortative matching in prisoners’ dilemma games.
Matching is non-assortative, if the probability to be matched
with an opponent of a particular type is independent of one’s
own type. Bergstrom (2002) provides an extensive list of
models of assortative matching, I refer to a particular one
that is related to my thesis: Eshel and Shaked (1999) model
an infinite population whose agents interact with and im-
itate their neighbors. It is the local interaction structure
that induces assortative matching; two neighbors are likely
to use the same strategy. Eshel and Shaked (1999) show that
in this model agents display as if-kinship behavior. Kinship
behaviour is described as behavior among relatives who care
for the payoffs of their siblings, ‘inclusive fitness’ according to
Hamilton (1964). A particular gene of an individual is likely
to be present in a close relative – hence the gene is more likely
to survive if it induces behavior of the indivudual that par-
tially internalizes the fitness of its closes relatives. By means
of a local interaction structure, Eshel and Shaked (1999) of-
fer a socio-economic explanation of the primary biological
phenomenon of kinship behavior.
The results implied by selection dynamics also crucially
depend on finiteness or infiniteness of key components of
the model. Taylor et al. (2004) provide an example (Exam-
5The original model is about mice that reproduce in hay stacks
during summer and regroup after each winter.
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ple 1) in which selection favors a dominated strategy in small
populations, although their dynamic depends (positively) on
individual payoffs. The intuition for this result is that if the
population is small, the weight of an individuum cannot be
neglected as in infinite populations, and as Schaffer (1980)
finds: if the population size is small, ‘spite’ can be a driv-
ing determinant of most successful behavior. His finite ver-
sion of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS, Maynard Smith
(1964)) can apply for dominated strategies in small popula-
tions. As the population size gets large, Taylor et al. (2004)s’
and Schaffer (1980)’s results coincide with those of models
with infinite populations. I present the results on stability
for large populations in the section on evolutionary stabil-
ity below. Oechssler and Riedel (2002) show that if the set
of strategies is continuous, an ESS may not be asymptoti-
cally stable for the replicator dynamic in doubly symmetric
games, opposing results of models with a finite set of strate-
gies (Taylor and Jonker (1978)). They propose the stronger
concept of evolutionary robustness, if asymptotic stability is
a desired property. I apply Oechssler and Riedel (2001)’s
existence result6 and their variational norm in chapter 3.
Selection dynamics differ with respect to the rationality
imposed on the agents. In any dynamic system considered
6Oechssler and Riedel (2001) provide conditions for the existence
of a solution of a differential equation defined on continuous strategy
spaces. This result is analogous to the Picard-Lindelo¨f-Theorem for
finite dimensional state spaces.
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here, agents are shortsighted. Among those myopic agents,
optimizers are the most rational ones and imitators re-
quire less rationality. The most extreme class are evolution-
ary selection dynamics, in which agents must ‘choose’ the
inherited strategy. The most famous representative of this
class is the replicator dynamic. Taylor and Jonker (1978)
define the replicator dynamic such that the growth rate of a
strategies equals the difference of its payoff and the popula-
tion average. Dawkins (1990) provides convincing social and
economic interpretations of the term replicator. Bjo¨rnerstedt
and Weibull (1996) and also Schlag (1998) show that a model
of imitation can induce the replicator dynamic. Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1988) relate the Lotka-Volterra equation and
its mathematical insights to the symmetric replicator dy-
namics. In particular, they show that if each strategy re-
ceives a positive mass under the symmetric replicator dy-
namic at all times, there exists a unique interior restpoint.
Furthermore, they derive conditions on the parameters of
the underlying game to characterize the volume of the im-
age of the solutions of the replicator dynamics. This can be
seen as the key argument for the results on asymptotic sta-
bility that I discuss in the next subsection. The literature
on optimizing agents is vast and since they do not play a
central role in my thesis, I mention only very few models:
in Kandori et al. (1993), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002),
Fudenberg and Levine (1995) or Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2002) agents choose best replies to their beliefs. In Berger
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and Hofbauer (2005) or Hofbauer et al. (2005) agents choose
better replies. An important difference to imitation dynam-
ics is that best- or better-reply-dynamics are innovative in
the sense that strategies that are absent in the population
can well receive positive probability at a particular time in
the future. In contrast, for imitation dynamics all homoge-
nous states are steady. In my thesis I apply general imitation
dynamics that include the replicator as a special case. Gen-
erally, an imitation dynamic must satisfy a continuity con-
dition, it must maintain constant measure and the growth
rates must be finite for any strategy at any state. As a con-
sequence, an imitation dynamic has a unique and continuous
solution for any initial condition. Furthermore, a strategy is
present at all times if and only if it is present at time zero. If
for any two strategies the one that yields higher payoffs has
the higher growth rate, the dynamics are (payoff-)monotonic
(Samuelson and Zhang (1992)). Another class of selection
processes are called convex monotonic dynamics (Hofbauer
and Weibull (1996)). Both convex– or payoff-monotonicity
is implied by aggregate monotonicity (Samuelson and Zhang
(1992)).
In the following section I summarize results on stability
for imitation dynamics.
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I.5 Literature on Evolutionary and
Dynamic Stability
In this section I consider only games with finitely many
strategies. Maynard Smith (1974) or Maynard Smith and
Price (1973) define the static concept of evolutionary stable
strategies in symmetric contexts. A strategy is evolutionary
stable, if agents applying that strategy in the presence of
a small fraction of (homogeneous) mutants fare better than
the mutants. Equivalently, a tupel of strategies is evolution-
ary stable, if i) it is a Nash equilibrium and if ii) it fares
better against alternative best replies than the alternative
best reply against itself. Selten (1980) considers asymmetric
context and assumes that each agent is randomly assign to a
player-role before interaction takes place. He shows that an
ESS in this symmetrized game must consist of the choice of
a strict Nash equilibrium strategy in the asymmetric game.
Swinkels (1992) provides a definition for an ESS in asymmet-
ric games with the same underlying intuition as in the ESS
for symmetric games and shows that in asymmetric games
an ESS is equivalent to a strict Nash equilibrium. Taylor
and Jonker (1978) show that for symmetric games a strat-
egy is an ESS if and only if it is asymptotically stable in
the replicator dynamics. If the ESS is in mixed strategies,
stability is an artefact of the single-population model ap-
plied for symmetric games. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)
establish – analogous to Selten (1980)’s or Swinkels (1992)’s
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results that in multi-population models a tupel of strategies
is asymptotically stable in the n-replicator dynamic if and
only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. It turns out that strict
Nash equilibria are the only asymptotically stable states for
general evolutionary selection dynamics. I discuss analogous
results for the stability of sets in the next subsection.
Setwise Stability
In the previous subsection, I reviewed the stability prop-
erties of strict Nash equilibrium. Balkenborg and Schlag
(2007) generalizes the definition of a strict Nash equilibrium
to a setwise concept: strict equilibrium set, SEset. A set
F is a SEset if it contains only Nash equilibria and if
it is closed with respect to mixed strategy best replies.
Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) and Cressman (2003) show
asymptotic stability of SEsets for general evolutionary
selection dynamics. If only two populations are considered,
they prove the according if and only if result. Thomas
(1985) and Balkenborg and Schlag (2001) define more
demanding Evolutionary stable sets.
The following three chapters contain my essays on
evolutionary game theory. Deviating from the models pre-
sented above, I analyze situations in which the population
of agents exhibits a particular structure. In chapters 1 and
2, the structure is given by non-uniform matching of the
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agents. In ‘Aniticipated Stability in Social and Economic
Networks’, agents actively choose with whom to match. I
model link formation with agents that have constrained
capabilities to foresee the consequences of their decisions. I
show that under these circumstances a permanent change
of matching decisions can be stable. I use the methods
of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998) to characterize stochastic
stability of random graphs.
In my second contribution, the deviation of the uniform-
matching is more subtle. Agents receive signals and choose
a strategy conditionally. As Mailath et al. (1997) remark,
a signal generating process can have the interpretation of
a matching technology. One section is devoted to empha-
size this matter. The case of uniform matching is equivalent
to independent signals. I show that behavior can be stable
with respect to imitation dynamics even if strategy choices
lead to non-Nash outcomes due to correlated signals. I show
for generic games that only strict Nash equilibria are robust
against manipulation of signals. I apply methods and results
of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995) and Balkenborg and Schlag (2007).
In chapter 3, I consider agents that hold non-verifiable in-
formation on the evolutionary relevant payoffs of the game.
The structure of the population refers to the distribution of
this information. I show that for any stable situation in 2×
2 games there can exist a positive mass of agents that opti-
mize given wrong information who are not selected against
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by evolutionary payoff monotonic selection dynamics. I base
my model partially on Sandholm (2001).
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Chapter 1
Anticipated Stability in
Social and Economic
Networks
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce the con-
cept of pairwise stability for graphs that repre-
sent social and economic networks, Jackson and
Watts (2002) provide a dynamic model of myopic
network formation that incorporates the static
concept of pairwise stability. Dutta et al. (2005)
provide a model of farsighted agents: players
know the actions of their coplayers for any pos-
sible network, are able to foresee the complete
future of play and act optimally accordingly. I
introduce agents that are neither myopic nor
completely farsighted. The agents establish an
anticipation of how the own decision influences
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the behavior of the other players when choosing
whether to form, maintain or sever a link, for a
subset of all networks. An anticipation of player
i given network g is a probability measure over
the possible paths that leave g, but stay in the
subset of networks. Agents optimize given their
anticipation. I provide examples of small cycles a`
la Jackson and Watts (2002) that include a net-
work that is stable in anticipation. The main
contribution of this chapter is hereby to pinpoint
that a cycle is an artificial concept resulting from
the assumption of myopia.
1.1 Introduction
When modelling social or economic interactions, some
economists focus on the issue of interaction patterns, in other
words, on the structure of agents interacting with each other.
If there is no such structure, groups of agents meet randomly,
as it is the case in simple evolutionary models. In a ba-
sic structure agents are located on a line and interact with
their neighbors. Given a specific model, for any agent in the
population, a structure defines a subpopulation of agents
with whom interaction is possible. Ellison (1993) or Eshel
and Shaked (1999) analyze the impact of various interaction
structures on the outcome of play. However, they assume
that agents cannot influence the interaction structure, that
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is, agents lack the ability of choosing whom to interact with.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) are among the first authors
studying a model of link formation. Starting in the empty
network, pair by pair the players involved are asked whether
they would want to form a link. Such a finite sequence of
pairs is called a rule of order. The authors show that for
each rule of order there exists a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. They raise the point of forward looking reasoning,
from the perspective of a player considering forming a link
with another one: “Suppose we form this new link, will other
players be motivated to form further new links that were not
worthwile for them before?”1 I analyse games in which the
rule of order is neither finite nor deterministic. I model the
structure of beliefs explicitely. This paper is close to Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), who define the structure of interaction
as a network. Any node in such a network represents an
agent, only agents that are linked are able to interact. Inter-
action is voluntary, which means that no subgroup of agents
can be linked if not all members agree to interact. Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996) consider coalitions of size two and
introduce the concept of pairwise stability. They find that
for any anonymous and component balanced allocation rule,
there is an open set of value functions such that no strongly
efficient graph is pairwise stable. Their framework is static;
it can characterise different types of networks as stable but
1Aumann and Myerson (1988), p.178
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it cannot explain how these types of networks emerge.
Jackson and Watts (2002) construct a dynamic model of
network formation that builds upon the concept of pairwise
stability. At each point in time, nature draws a pair of
agents. Those two agents agree to form or maintain a link
if and only if both are better off. If the network does not
change, no matter which link is under revision, it is pairwise
stable. In this dynamic model, agents are myopic. When
creating or cutting a link, agents do not take into account
that this decision can trigger a sequence of link creations
or destructions. In other words, they optimise under ceteris
paribus assumptions. These assumptions can make sense, if
the agents face a very complex world. The number of po-
tential links within a network increases ‘very fast’2 with the
number of nodes. If the model consists of many agents, one
could argue that if their capability of computing optimal de-
cisions is limited, the best they can do is to assume that
everyone else will continue as they did before. This myopia
assumption can lead to cycles. A cycle is a finite sequence of
networks, such that if the last network is reached, the process
starts again at the first network.
Watts (2001) and Dutta et al. (2005) assume the other ex-
treme of rationality: in equilibrium, every agent knows what
every other agent will do, for any possible network. Given
some strategy-tupel, agents expect a sequence of networks
2of order O(2n(n−1)/2)
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to evolve and optimise, discounting future payoffs along this
expected sequence. This approach is intuitive if the number
of agents within the model is small, that is: small enough
such that it is plausible that each agent knows about the
strategic plans of all other agents, at least in equilibrium.
In this chapter, I introduce a dynamic model that
has a flexible boundary for the rationality of the agents.
First, I define the distance between any two networks. I
assume, that agents can optimise their expected utility
along discounted sequences of networks, if these sequences
consist only of networks that are closer than some boundary
κ. In settings with many agents, this boundary can be set
rather small, in models with very few agents, κ can be set
rather large. Further, I analise stochastic properties of the
model, where I apply the methods of Freidlin and Wentzell
(1998) on a continous state space.
This paper is organised as follows: in section 2, I con-
struct the model and define anticipated stability. In section
3 I define stochastically stable states and show that if a state
is stochastically stable, it must be stable in anticipation.
In section 4, I illustrate some properties of this concept by
three examples. In particular I show that a small myopic
cycle may include a network that is stable in anticipation.
In section 5, I conclude.
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1.2 Model
1.2.1 Definitions
I closely follow Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Let there be
2 < n < ∞ players and each player i be identified with a
node of some undirected graph g. A graph is undirected,
if a link from node i to node j is the same as a link from
j to i. The graph consists of a set of nodes, I = {1, ..., n}
and a set of edges E . An edge or link between players i and
j is denoted by ij . A node i cannot be linked to itself, ie
ii 6∈ g ∀ i ∈ I. g is complete, if each player i is linked to
each other player j, E is the set of all possible edges Ec. I
denote the complete graph by gc. For all other graphs g, E
is an element of the powerset of Ec, P(Ec) = {E|E ⊆ Ec}.
g is empty, if no player i is linked to some other player j
and E = ∅. I denote the empty graph by ge. I denote the
set of undirected graphs with n nodes by G. Since I do not
vary the number of players n, I often will identify a graph g
directly with its set of edges E .
A permutation is a bijection pi : I → I. The graph
gpi = {ij |i = pi(k), j = pi(l) ∀ kl ∈ g} is the network
obtained from graph g by relabelling the players according
to the permutation pi. The set Gpi(g) = {g˜ ∈ G|∃ pi such that
g˜ = gpi} is the set of networks with the same architecture as g.
An allocation rule Y : G → Rn assigns a real number
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to each player for a given graph g. Since G is finite, the
image of Y is bounded.
Pairwise stability is defined as in Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996):
The graph g is pairwise stable if for all players i ∈ I and all
links ij ∈ Ec
(i) Yi(g) ≥ Yi(g \ {ij})
(no unilateral destruction)
(ii) Yi(g) < Yi(g ∪ {ij}) ⇒ Yj(g) > Yj(g ∪ {ij}).
(no bilateral formation)
Two networks g 6= g′ are adjacent if they differ only
with respect to one link ij , so either g = g′ ∪ {ij} or
g = g′ \ {ij}.
A path p(g, g′) = {g0, ..., gL} of length L is a sequence
of adjacent or equal graphs, with g = g0 and g
′ = gL.
Associated to each path {g0, . . . , gL} denote by {ij l}Ll=1
the set of links to which respect the graphs g0, . . . , gL are
adjacent: ij l = gl 	 gl−1.3
Unlike in Jackson and Watts (2002), here a path needs not
to be finite, i.e. I do not exclude the possibility of the same
network appearing infinitely often in one path.
3A	B = (A \B) ∪ (B \A) (symmetric difference)
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A path p(g, g′) is improving if for each l = 1, ..., L it
holds that ij l 6= ∅ and
if gl = gl−1 \ {ij l} ⇒ Yi(gl) > Yi(gl−1, v) ∨ Yj(gl) > Yj(gl−1)
if gl = gl−1 ∪ {ij l} ⇒ Yi(gl) ≥ Yi(gl−1, v) ∧ Yj(gl) ≥ Yj(gl−1),
one inequality being strict.
A cycle is a nonempty set of networks C = {gl} such
that there is an improving path p(g, g′) for all g, g′ ∈ C. A
cycle C is maximal if there is no cycle C ′ 6= C such that
C ⊂ C ′. A cycle C is closed if there exists no pair of graphs
g ∈ C and g′ 6∈ C such that there is an improving path
p(g, g′).
Jackson and Watts (2002) show that for any Y there
exists at least one pairwise stable network or closed cycle of
networks.
1.2.2 Dynamics without Mutations
At each point in time, one and only one link ij ∈ Ec is ran-
domly and independently drawn with uniform probability
f = 2
n(n−1) .
4
4Uniform probability is used to simplify the calculations of the
transit-probability along a sequence of networks. One could also al-
low for heterogeneous positive and constant probabilities.
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The two agents i and j decide simultaneously whether
to form or keep the link ij or not. I call the respective
action specific willingness to form links5 of player i, given
network g:
ai(g) = (ai1(g), . . . , ai,i−1(g), 0, ai,i+1(g), . . . , ain(g)).
aij (g) = 1 if i is willing to form or maintain a link to j,
given g and aij (g) = 0 if i strictly prefers not to be linked to
j. However, aij (g) can be any real in [0, 1] if i is indifferent
and denotes the probability with which i wants to form
a link to j. Since a player cannot be linked to herself,
aii(g) ≡ 0 ∀ i ∈ I, g ∈ G. ai(g) is an action. A strategy for
player i is a collection ai = {ai(g)}g∈G. a(g) = {ai(g)}i∈I
denotes the set of actions at network g. a denotes the
set {{ai(g)}g∈G}i∈I . For any given network g the space of
actions for player i is [0, 1]n−1. Since #G = 2n(n−1)2 , the
strategy space for player i is [0, 1](n−1)2
n(n−1)
2 . Obviously,
this space expands extremely fast with n, the number of
players. This is the reason why I introduce the notion of a
bounded strategy below.
If ij 6∈ g, the probability of moving from g to g′ = g ∪ {ij}
is f · aij (g) · aji(g). Analogous, if ij ∈ g, the probability of
moving from g to g′ = g\{ij} is f ·(1−aij (g)·aji(g)). In each
of both cases, there is only one event that makes it possible
5See Durieu et al. (2004) for a model of nonspecific networking.
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to move from g to g′, namely the event that {ij} = g 	 g′
is drawn. To calculate the probability of remaining in a
specific graph g, I need to consider more events. Suppose
a link ij ∈ g is drawn. Then, the probability to stay in g
is aij (g) · aji(g). Suppose a link ij 6∈ g is drawn, then the
probability that g remains unaltered is 1 − aij (g) · aji(g).
Hence, there is one possibility for each potential link
ij ∈ Ec to stay in a particular graph. Call f ·
[
g
a(g)→ g
]
the
probability to remain in g, given a(g), where[
g
a(g)→ g
]
=
∑
ij∈g aijaji +
∑
ij 6∈g 1− aijaji .
The probability of observing the path p(g, g′) = (g0, . . . , gL)
of adjacent or equal networks in the next L points of time,
given a = {{ai(g)}g∈G}i∈I and aij l = aij l(gl), is
Prob{p(g, g′)|a} =
fL·
L∏
l=1
{
1I(∪)aij l · ajil + 1I(\)(1− aij l · ajil) + 1I(=)
[
gl
a(g)→ gl
]}
,
(1.1)
where 1I(∪) = 1 if ij l ∈ gl and 0 otherwise,
1I(\) = 1 if ij l 6∈ gl and 0 otherwise,
1I(=) = 1 if ij l = {∅} and 0 otherwise.
In the following, I modify the concept of pairwise sta-
bility. As already indicated by Jackson and Watts (2002),
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the concept of pairwise stability is myopic, that is players
do not consider future changes of the network which they
may trigger when severing or forming a link. Jackson and
Watts (2002) argue that if the network includes many other
players it may be not too strong a restriction to assume that
players do not have the capacity to foresee the succeeding
changes of the network. Nevertheless, in some cases it would
suffice if a player could anticipate the next few alterations
he triggers to give that player an incentive to deviate from
myopic behavior. Dutta et al. (2005) consider the other
polar case of rationality: in equilibrium, each player has
some complete plan of action for each possible network and
this plan of action is common knowledge among all players.
In contrast to Jackson and Watts (2002), the requirements
for the rationality of the involved agents are extremely high
if there exist more than a few agents. Note that there are
2
n(n−1)
2 distinct networks with n nodes. If – for example
– there are only 5 players, each player has to know the
4 times 1024 strategic plans of his coplayers. Therefore,
in the current chapter I propose a flexible concept that is
applicable to settings with an arbitrary number of agents.
Players form beliefs concerning behavior in a subset of
networks “around” the current network. Their degree of
rationality is captured by some parameter κ. If κ = 1, our
model is similar to that of Jackson and Watts (2002) , if κ
is higher than some finite number I approximate the case
studied by Dutta et al. (2005) .
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Anticipation
Under pairwise stability, each player maximizes his utility
under the hypothesis that all other players behave as in
the last period. Alternatively, players could have more
sophisticated beliefs concerning the future behavior of
their coplayers. I assume that each player anticipates the
behavior of all players up to κ networks away from the
current one. More precisely, g˜ is up to κ networks away
from g, if g˜ is included in a path of length κ of adjacent
networks starting at g. In equilibrium, such anticipations
need to be correctly specified only for those states that are
actually reached – I am interested in equilibria that confirm
the beliefs.6
A belief Bi of player i is a set of matrices {Bi(g)}g∈G =

0 βi12(g) . . . β
i
1n(g)
βi21(g) 0 . . . β
i
2n(g)
...
...
. . .
...
βin1(g) β
i
n2(g) . . . 0


g∈G
.
The element βijk(g) denotes i’s belief of the willingness
ajk(g) of player j to form or maintain the link jk with k,
given g. I assume that beliefs about own actions βii·(g)
coincide with the respective willingness ai· to form a specific
6See Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Noeldeke and Samuelson
(1993)
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link. Denote by G(g)κ the set of networks that have distance
of at most κ from g.
Let Pκ(g) denote the set of all paths of infinite length
that start at graph g and consist only of networks in Gκ(g)
Pκ(g, g′) is the set of all paths in Pκ(g) that have g′ as a
direct successor of g, Pκ(g, g′) =
{{gl}l ∈ Pκ(g) ∣∣ g1 = g′}.
Given Bi(g), player i believes that the network g will
remain unaltered with probability f ·
[
g
Bi(g)→ g
]
, where
[
g
Bi(g)→ g
]
=
maintain∑
jk∈g
βijk(g) · βikj(g) +
don’t form new∑
jk 6∈g
(
1− βijk(g) · βikj(g)
)
.
To give an example, consider the case in which player i
believes that the process will stay in network g. That
is, βikl = 1, if kl ∈ g and βikl = 0, if kl 6∈ g. In this
case,
[
g
Bi(g)→ g
]
=
∑
kl∈g 1 +
∑
kl 6∈g 1 =
n(n−1)
2
and since
f = 2
n(n−1) represents the unifom distribution over all links,
f ·
[
g
Bi(g)→ g
]
= 1.
An anticipation of player k starting at g, αkg = {αk(p)}p∈Pκ(g)
is a probability measure over the set of paths p starting at g,
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Pκ(g), induced by the belief Bk. Define ∀ p ∈ Pκ(g), αk(p) :=
∞∏
l=1
{
1I(∪)f · βkij l · βkjil + 1I(\)f · (1− βkij l · βkjil) + 1I(=)f ·
[
g
Bk(g)→ g
]}
(1.2)
A class of (infinitely many) paths may receive positive prob-
ability. I give a simple example: Suppose that g = {ij} and
g′ = {∅}, g′ ∈ G(g)κ. Define Bi(g) as βiij (g) = βiij (g′) = 12
and βiji(g) = β
i
ji(g
′) = 1, all other elements being equal to
zero. Given these beliefs, there are four transitions, which
occur with positive probability: g → g, g → g′, g′ → g′
and g′ → g. The probability for each transition is strictly
smaller than 1, but the process will follow a path that
consist only of g or g′ with probability one, if it starts at g.
Definition unbiased anticipation
An anticipation αig = {αi(p)}p∈Pκ(g) is unbiased if
αi(p) = Prob{p | a} ∀p ∈ Pκ(g), where Prob{p | a}
is defined in (1.1).
The set of beliefs that imply unbiased anticipations is
closed. Given network g, suppose the link ij will occur with
probability a = aij (g) · aji(g). If a > 0, the set of unbi-
ased beliefs (βkij , β
k
ji) is {βkij , βkji ∈ (0, 1] : βkji = a/βkij}.
If a = 0, the set of unbiased beliefs (βkij , β
k
ji) is
{βkij , βkji ∈ [0, 1] : min{βkji, βkij} = 0}.
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Discounted Utility
Let ui(p) denote the discounted utility of player i along the
path p = {g0, g1, ...}, given discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).7
ui(p) =
∞∑
l=0
δlYi(gl, v).
Denote by Ui(g|αig) the expected discounted utility of player
i along paths starting at g given anticipation αig.
Ui(g|αig) =
∑
p∈Pκ(g)
αig(p)ui(p)
Since αig is a probability measure over Pκ(g), I have∑
p∈Pκ(g) α
i
g(p) = 1. Since Yi(·) is bounded and δ < 1, ui(·)
is bounded and Ui(·) is well defined.
Given network g, beliefs Bi and actions ai·(·), I can
calculate the anticipation αig. Note that beliefs for networks
that are not in Gκ(g) are irrelevant for αig. Since the space
of all ai·(·), [0, 1](n−1)#Gκ(g) ⊆ [0, 1](n−1)2
n(n−1)
2 is compact
and αig is continous (linear, in particular) in ai, there exists
an a∗i that maximizes Ui(g|αig) and the set of all maximizing
a∗i is compact.
Definition optimal anticipation
I call αig optimal if it consists of a maximizing a
∗
i .
7If δ = 0, the model is similar to the one of Jackson and Watts
(2002) (with the convention 00 = 1) .
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An anticipation is induced by beliefs about the ac-
tions of other players and own actions. If the anticipation is
optimal, own actions are chosen optimally given the beliefs
about the actions of other players. For each g, there may
be multiple optimal anticipations αig supported by different
sets of beliefs Bi.
Suppose the current network is g and that the link
ij ∈ g is drawn. Suppose G′ can be obtained by remov-
ing ij from g. I say that g′ defeats g, or g I g′, if for
l ∈ {i, j} there exist an optimal anticipation αlg such that∑
p∈Pκ(g,g′) α
l
g(p) > 0. This means that g
′ follows g with
positive probability, if l chooses al optimally. If ij 6∈ g, ie if
both i and j must agree to form the link ij , g′ defeats g or
g I g′ if there exist optimal anticipations αlg for l = i ∧ j
such that
∑
p∈Pκ(g,g′) α
l
g(p) > 0 for l = i ∧ j.
If there is a graph g with optimal anticipations αi(g) ∀ i
such that
∑
p∈Pκ(g,g) α
i
g(p) = 1 ∀i, then g I g.
Definition improving in anticipation path or α−path
Given an action profile a and a set of beliefs {Bi}i, a
path p = {gl}l is improving in anticipation if the beliefs
induce optimal and unbiased anticipations such that
gl I gl+1 ∀l = 1, 2, . . . .
Definition stable in anticipation graph or α−stable graph
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A graph g∗ is stable in anticipation if there is no α−path
p = {gl}l leaving g∗.
g∗ α− stable⇒ ∃α− path{g∗, g∗, . . .}
If there is no α−path leaving g∗, there is no network
g′ defeating g∗, ie
∑
p∈Pκ(g∗,g∗) = 1 ∀ i for all optimal
anticipations.
Analogous to Jackson and Watts (2002) I define a closed
anticipated cycle.
An anticipated cycle is a set of networks C = {gl} such that
there is an α−path p(g, g′) for all g, g′ ∈ C. An anticipated
cycle C is maximal if there is no anticipated cycle C ′ such
that C ⊂ C ′. An anticipated cycle C is closed if there exists
no pair of graphs g ∈ C and g′ 6∈ C such that there is an
α−path p(g, g′).
Lemma
There exists either a network that is stable in anticipation
or there exists a closed anticipated cycle.
Proof
Suppose there is no network that is stable in anticipation.
This means that for any network g ∈ G there exists a
α-path starting at g. Since the number of nodes n is finite,
so must be the set of networks G. Fix for any network
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g one particular α-path that starts at g and consider
only the first step of that path. Since G is finite, any
network g must be reached again after finitely many such
steps, hence there is an anticipated cycle. Since G is
finite, the union of any such anticipated cycles is finite.
Therefore, there is a maximal anticipated cycle. A maximal
anticipated cycle necessarily is a closed aniticipated cycle. 
Remark
The concept of beliefs appears quite demanding, concern-
ing the capabilities of the players. Note, for all that, if
the process is in a closed anticipated cycle C, any be-
liefs {B(g˜)}g˜ 6∈G(C)κ8 are irrelevant to the unbiasedness of
αg ∀g ∈ G(C). Furthermore, there may be multiple beliefs
{B(g)}g∈G(C) that yield unbiased anticipations given some
profile of actions a.
1.3 Stochastic Stability
I define stochastic stability as in Foster and Young (1990)
who build upon the work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998).
Firstly I define a state and the continous set of all states.
Thereafter I construct a non-ergodic Markov chain which
represents the anticipated dynamics of the game without
8G(C)κ denotes all networks that have distance of at most κ to the
set C, ie G(C)κ = ∪
g∈C
G(g)κ.
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mutations. Then I set up an appropriate model of mutations
that generates an ergodic Markov chain and allows us to
define the resistance of each state. As in any ergodic
process, there is a unique invariant distribution. I analyze
this distribution as mutations become very rare. If a state
receives positive probability in the invariant distribution as
the probability of a mutation goes to zero, I call this state
stochastically stable. I show that among the absorbing
states of the undisturbed process those who have minimum
resistance in the process with mutations are stochastically
stable. Finally, I show that a state is stochastically stable
only if it is stable in anticipation.
State Space Θ
A state θ consists of a network g ∈ G and a set of beliefs
B =
{
{Bi(g′)}g′∈G
}
i∈N
∈ [0, 1]n2(n−1)2
n(n−1)
2 ≡ B. a(θ) is the
profile of actions included in B, a(θ) = {{βii·(g′)}g′∈G}i∈N .
Each agent i has some belief βikl(g
′) about k’s willingness
to form a link with l for each network g′ and each pair of
players k and l. Nevertheless, to calculate optimal actions,
each player i does only need to consider {Bi(g′)}g′∈Gκ(g),
which is small compared to B, if κ is small. Call B∗ ⊂ B
the subset of optimal and unbiased beliefs. That is, for each
g ∈ G, only those anticipations αig generated by beliefs in
B∗ are unbiased and optimal. I will define a finite partition
of Θ below and apply the methods to its index-set.
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Transitions
I assume that players update their beliefs infinitely faster
than they change their actions. I further assume that
players update their beliefs such that they do not contradict
the observed action profiles. Players choose any such beliefs
with uniform probability. This implies that I can model the
transitions of the process such that at each point in time the
beliefs yield unbiased anticipations. Given these unbiased
anticipations, players choose their actions optimally, the
process follows α−paths.
Absorbing Sets
A closed maximal anticipated cycle C together with unbiased
and optimal beliefs B ⊂ B∗ is absorbing. If C is singleton,
then it is a graph g∗ that is stable in anticipation. Call A
the set of states that represent graphs that are contained
in closed maximal anticipated cycles, together with their
unbiased and optimal beliefs. Since both the set of unbiased
beliefs and the set of optimal beliefs are compact, so is
A. Let {K1, . . . , KL} be a partition of A, let K0 = Θ \ A
and define K = {K0, . . . , KL}. Define the partition such
that two graphs g and g′ together with their unbiased and
optimal beliefs belong to the same Kl, l > 0, if and only if
they belong to the same closed maximal anticipated cycle
C. If g∗ is stable in anticipation and < g∗,B > ∈ Kl, there
is no other graph belonging to Kl. Since G is finite and the
set of optimal and unbiased beliefs is compact, so is Kl, in
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particular, the cardinality of K is finite, L <∞.
Mutations
Suppose that in each period, each player follows the transi-
tion process described above with probability 1 −  ∈ (0, 1)
and behaves differently, say ‘mutates’, with probability
 > 0. If some agent i derived some optimal anticipation
and after mixing according to his specific willingnes to
form a link with j, i actually wants to form a link with
j, a mutation causes him to sever or deny that link and
vice versa. Concerning the beliefs, a mutation has more
drastic consequences. A mutating player chooses any beliefs
with uniform probability and chooses optimal actions with
respect to these new beliefs.9
It is possible to reach any state θ′ from any other
state θ only by means of (multiple) mutations.10 For
example, if θ represents the complete network, one muta-
tion for each of the n(n−1)
2
links can cause the process to
transit to a state θ′ which represents the empty network.
Another n mutations would be necessary to change all
9Alternatively, one could consider a weaker model of mutations:
instead of replacing the whole set of beliefs {Bi(g)}g∈G , a mutation
changes only one entry βikl of {Bi(g)}g∈G .
10There is one difference to the model of mutations of Jackson and
Watts (2002): to build up a link that should not exist without muta-
tions, I need two mutations instead of one. This difference is concep-
tually negligible.
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beliefs. However, to reach the complete network only
by means of mutations if the current network is empty,
the number of necessary mutations is 2 · n(n−1)
2
, because
for any link that is to be formed, both agents need to mutate.
The essential properties of this model of mutations,
are that (i) it is possible to reach any state θ′ from any state
θ with a finite number of mutations in finite time11 (⇒ irre-
ducibility) and that (ii) the probability of a single mutation
is of the same order in  for any state θ ∈ Θ (see Bergin
and Lipman (1996)). Given this model of mutations, there
exists a stochastic kernel p : Θ×Θ → R with the property
that for any pair of states θ, θ′ ∈ Θ the probability of a
transition from θ to θ′ is positive, p(θ, θ′) > 0, for any  > 0.
l−trees
Referring to Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), chp. 6, I define a
tree on the index set L = {0, . . . , L} of the partition K. An
l−tree is a set of directed edges m→ n, m ∈ L \ {l}, n ∈ L
such that any index m ∈ L \ {l} has a unique successor
n and such that there are no closed cycles of the form
m1 → m2 → . . . → mk → m1. Consequently, in such a
graph, there is a unique sequence from any state k ∈ L \ {l}
to l. Denote by H(l) all l−trees.
11In my model of mutations such a transition is possible in one step
in which multiple mutations occur.
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Volume of l−trees
For numbers pmn ∈ R+,m, n ∈ L define for any l−tree hl
the volume V (hl) =
∏
(m→n)∈hl
pmn.
Lemma 2.1: invariant measure µ on K (Freidlin
and Wentzell (1998))
Let us be given an irreducible Markov chain on space
Θ devided into disjoint sets {Kl}l∈L with kernel
p : Θ × Θ → R. Suppose there exist non-negative
numbers plm(l 6= m, l,m ∈ L) and a number c > 1 such that
c−1plm ≤ p(θ,Km) ≤ cplm ∀ θ ∈ Kl, l 6= m for the transition
probabilities of our chain. Then
c2−2L
(∑
m∈L
Qm
)−1
Ql ≤ µ(Kl) ≤ c2L−2
(∑
m∈L
Qm
)−1
Ql
for any normalized invariant measure µ of our chain, where
Ql =
∑
hl∈H(l) V (hl).
Proof:
I apply Lemma 3.2 of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998),
p.178. Our V (h) is their pi(h) for any tree h. The
Markov chain is irreducible for any positive  since
p(θ, θ′) > 0 ∀ θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. Given the stochastic kernel
p : Θ × Θ → R, define p(θ,Kn) =
∫
Kn
p(θ, θ′)dθ′ and
pmn = sup
θ∈Km
p(θ,Kn) and c =
sup
θ∈Km
p(θ,Kn)
inf
θ∈Km
p(θ,Kn)
> 1. Then
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c−1pmn ≤ p(θ,Kn) ≤ cpmn ∀ θ ∈ Km.
Resistance
Define the resistance of a pair of states (θ, θ′) as the number
of mutations necessary for the process to move from θ
to θ′ with positive probability. For two adjacent states
θ =< g,B > and θ′ =< g′,B′ > define
Rθ,θ′ =

0 if B′ ∈ B∗ and g I g′
in some α− path induced by B′
if B′ 6∈ B∗ and g I g′
in some α− path induced by B′
1 or
if B′ ∈ B∗ and g I g′
in no α− path induced by B′
and g ⊃ g′
2 if there is no α− path
such that g I g′ and g ⊆ g′
For two non-adjacent states θ =< g,B > and θ′ =< g′,B′ >
define as P θ
′
θ the set of shortest paths of adjacent networks
that start at g and end at g′. For any p = (θ1, . . . , θK) ∈ P θ′θ ,
define R(p) =
∑K−1
k=1 Rθl,θl+1 . Define Rθ,θ′ = min
p∈P θ′θ
R(p).
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Observe that for any two states θ, θ′ ∈ Kl for any
l > 0, the resistance of a transition from θ to θ′ is zero.
Resistance of l−trees
Define the resistance of a transition from set Kl to set Kk by
Rl,k = min
θ∈Kl
min
θ′∈Kk
Rθ,θ′ . The resistance of a tree hl is the sum
of the resistance of its elements: R(hl) =
∑
(m→n)∈hl Rm,n.
Finally, the resistance of an index l ∈ L is defined by the
minimal resistance of an l-tree: Rl = min
hl∈H(l)
R(hl).
Lemma 2.2
If k = arg min
l∈L
Rl, then any θ ∈ Kk represents a graph g
and beliefs B such that either g is stable in anticipation
with respect to B or g belongs to a closed anticipated cycle C.
Proof:
If a graph g is not stable in anticipation or does not belong
to a closed maximal cycle, it belongs to a state θ ∈ K0,
by definition of the set K0. I showed that there exists at
least one network that is stable in anticipation or one closed
maximal anticipated cycle, i.e. Θ \ {K0} 6= ∅. Therefore
it remains to show that R0 > Rl for some l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
Consider the tree h0 that minimizes the resistance over all
0−trees in H(0). Since in K0 there exists no graph that is
stable in anticipation or a closed maximal anticipated cycle,
there must be a state θ ∈ K0 with beliefs B∗ such that they
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generate an α−path that starts at θ and leads to a state
θ′ ∈ Kl, l > 0. By the definition of resistance, the edge
0 → l has resistance zero. Consider the edge l → m ∈ h0.
Since Kl is an absorbing set, the edge l → m must contain
a transition wich is not part of an α−path. Therefore, the
resistance of l → m must be greater or equal to 1. Now
remove the edge l → m and add the edge 0 → l. The
constructed tree has resistance of at most R0 − 1. 
Definition
A function f() : R+ → R+ is called of order =k, de-
noted by O(=k), if (i) lim sup
→0
f()/k < ∞ and (ii)
lim sup
→0
f()/k+1 = ∞. If (i) holds, f() is called O(≥k),
and if (ii) holds, f() is called O(≤k).
Lemma 2.3 Ql = O(
Rl) ∀ l ∈ L.
Proof
For two functions f() = O(a) and g() = O(b), a < b, I
have f()g() = O(a+b) and f() + g() = O(a).
Consider the l−tree hl, that minimizes the resistance in H(l).
For any arrow (i→ j) ∈ hl, Ri,j is the miminum number of
mutations that is necessary to transit from a state in Ki to
a state in Kj. Hence pij = sup
θ∈Ki
∫
Kj
p(θ, θ′)dθ′ = O(Ri,j).
Hence V (hl) =
∏
(i→j)∈hl) pij = O(
∑
(i→j)∈hl Ri,j) = O(Rl),
where Rl =
∑
(i→j)∈hl Ri,j is the minimum number of
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mutations necessary to move along all arrows in hl. Since
Rl ≤ R(h) ∀ h ∈ H(l), I have
∑
h∈H(l) V (h) = O(Rl), which
completes the proof. 
Theorem 2.1 µ(K0) −→
→0
0.
Proof
Since k = arg min
l∈L
Rl 6= 0 and
∑
l∈LQl = O(
Rk) it follows
that O0/
∑
l∈LOl = O(
R0−Rk) −→
→0
0. It follows directly
from lemma 2.1 that 0 ≤ lim→0 µ(K0) ≤ 0. 
I call states that receive positive probability by the
invariant distribution µ as the rate of mutations  goes to
zero stochastically stable.
To conclude, I state the contraposition of the theo-
rem:
Corrollary 2.1
If a state is stochastically stable, it must represent a part
of a maximal closed anticipated cycle or it represents a
network that is stable in anticipation.
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1.4 Examples
1.4.1 Example 1
Let the allocation rule be defined as follows, and κ = 2:
r
0
r 0 r0
g0
r
x
r x r0



g1
r
y
r z rz



A
A
A
A
A
A
g2
r
w
r w rwAAA
A
A
A






g3
I assume the following inequalities: w > y > 0 > x > z.
Here, the allocation rule is anonymous, i.e. invariant to the
labels of the players. If players behave as in Jackson and
Watts (2002), two types of networks are pairwise stable: g0
and g3, the latter pareto dominating the former. One muta-
tion in g3 causes the process to reach g0 with positive proba-
bility while two mutations are necessary to cause the process
to transit from g0 to g3, hence g0 is the only network that
is stochastically stable, given the process is myopic. If play-
ers are nonmyopic and follow the anticipated dynamics pre-
sented in this paper with κ = 2 both g0 and g3 are α−stable
(with appropriate anticipations). I show that i) the process
50
can move from g0 to g3 with positive probability, if one mu-
tation occurred and that ii) one mutation suffices to reach g0
from g3. Therefore both g0 and g3 are stochastically stable.
To start with i), suppose players have myopic beliefs a` la
Jackson and Watts (2002) of the following form, where the
first row is i’s, the second is j’s and the last is k’s.
B(g0) = B({ij}) = B({ik}) = B({jk}) =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

B({ij , jk}) =
 0 0 10 0 0
1 0 0
 ,B({ij , ik}) =
 0 0 00 0 1
0 1 0
 ,
B({ik, jk}) =
 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
 , B(g3) =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

These beliefs support both g0 and g3 as stable in anticipa-
tion. I show that the process can drift12 to a state that
still supports g0 as α−stable, but from which one mutation
causes a transit from g0 to g3.
Suppose that by mutation, player i thinks that both j
and k are willing to form or maintain the link with i in the
networks {ij} and {ij , ik}. As long as the process is only in
12Drift is a sequence of single mutations with the property that after
each mutation, there is infinite time for the selection process to settle
at a rest point ((Samuelson, 1997, chap. 6)).
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g0 these beliefs cannot be falsified and hence are unbiased.
In {ij , ik}, it is optimal for i to maintain the links to j and k,
since i receives positive payoffs in {ij , ik} and non-positive
payoffs in g0 or {ij}. For the same reason it is optimal for
i to accept the link to k in {ij}. Given Bdi , there is only
one type of path leaving {ij}:
(
K
{ij}
∞
{ij ,ik}
)
, where K
g
denotes
a K-fold sequence of g. This path occurs with probability(
2
3
)K−1 1
3
and generates discounted utility ui(p) =
x+(y−x)δK
1−δ .
Therefore, Ui({ij}) =
∑∞
K=1
(
2
3
)K−1 1
3
x+(y−x)δK
1−δ =
3x(1−δ)+yδ
(1−δ)(3−2δ)
and if 3x(1 − δ) + yδ > 0, it is optimal for i to maintain
the link with j in {ij}. Furthermore, i is indifferent between
being willing to form a link with j in g0 since he believes
that j would reject this link anyway. Therefore, the beliefs
Bdi listed below are unbiased and optimal, can be reached by
drift and still support g0 as α−stable.
Bdi (g) = B(g) ∀ g ∈ G \ {g0, {ij}, {ij , ik}}
Bdi ({g0}) =
 0 1 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , Bdi ({ij}) =
 0 1 11 0 0
1 0 0
 ,
BMi ({ij , ik}) =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

If player k believes that player i rejects the link ik in the
network ij , it is optimal for k to be willing to form the link
ik with i in ij . Hence the state, where k believes Bdk as
52
defined below can be reached by drift and still g0 would be
α−stable.
Bdk({ij}) =
 0 0 00 0 0
1 0 0
 , Bdk(g) = Bk(g) ∀ g ∈ G \ {ij}
Now suppose that in the empty network player j mutates
and is willing to form a link to i. Suppose that the next
three links that are drawn by nature are, in this specific
‘rule of order’, ij , ik and jk. In g0, players i and j form the
link ij , i because it is optimal given Bdi , j because of the
mutation. Next period in the just established network {ij},
i and k form the link ik because it is optimal given Bdi and
Bdk and the process transits to {ij , ik}. There, it is optimal
for j and k to form the link jk to reach g3 in which both
receive maximal payoffs.
Since the observed path (g0, {ij}, {ij , ik}, g3) contradicts
the beliefs
(Bdi ,Bj,Bdk) the players need to update and opti-
mize their beliefs to
(B′i,B′j,B′k). These new beliefs induce
anticipations such that g3 is stable in anticipation.
There are many more beliefs that support g3 as α−stable.
Each of these beliefs could have been reached by drift. One
of these is B0, as specified below:
B0(g3) =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
 , B0(g) =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 ∀ g ∈ G\{g3}
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B0 is the one that makes a transition from g3 to g0 most
likely. B0 are quite pessimistic beliefs, hoIver they are unbi-
ased and optimal.
I now show that one mutation suffices to trigger the pro-
cess to transit from g3 to g0. Suppose the process drifted to
a state in which each player beliefs B0 and that player k mu-
tates in g3 and rejects to maintain the link ik and suppose
the link ij is drawn in {ij , jk} in the next period. Given B0,
i’s anticipation attaches positive probability to two types of
graphs:
(
K
{jk}
∞
g0
)
and
(
K
{ij}
∞
g0
)
. While i receives negative
discounted utility in paths of the latter type, the utility in
paths of the first type is zero. Hence in {ij , jk} i rejects the
link to j. In jk, both j and k will refuse to maintain the link
and therefore the process transits to g0.
To summarize, I showed that from a state in which g0 is
stable in anticipation, after drifting by single mutations, the
process needs one mutation to transit to a state in which g3
is stable in anticipation. Thereafter, after drift, the process
needs one mutation to transit back to a state in which g0
is stable in anticipation. In the words of Samuelson (1997),
chap. 7, both g0 and g3 are in a one-mutation-neighborhood
and hence are both stochastically stable.
1.4.2 Example 2
In the next example I show that inefficient outcomes may
be stable in anticipation. Suppose the allocation rule is as
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follows:13
r
0
r 0 r0
g0
r
1
r 1 r0



g1
r
0
r 0 r0



A
A
A
A
A
A
g2
r
1
r 1 r1 AAA
A
A
A






g3
Both g0 and g3 are pairwise stable and stable in anticipation.
g2 is in the basin of attraction of both graphs and it is only
“one mutation away” from each of the two absorbing graphs.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I construct a model of forward looking be-
haviour, however, I restrict the capability of the players.
Agents believe that the state of the game changes not too
much from the current state. I analyse a very special model
of network formation. I give examples in which boundedly
13This example is taken from Dutta et al. (2005)
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rational players are willing to forgo potential current payoffs
in order to wait for a more attractive network to evolve. In
our setup the beliefs of the agents are a part of the state of
the game. It could be interesting to generalise this concept
to infinitely repeated games of incomplete information, as,
for example, a bargaining game in which the share and the
beliefs about acceptance levels and outside options define the
state.
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Chapter 2
Evolution and
Correlated Equilibrium
In this chapter I show that a set of outcomes that
lies outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria
can be asymptotically stable with respect to an
evolutionary dynamic that satisfies convex mono-
tonicity. In the model presented here, boundedly
rational agents receive signals and condition the
choice of strategies on the signals. A set of con-
ditional strategies is asymptotically stable only
if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium
set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot
be represented by an asymptotically stable signal
contingent strategy. For generic games I show
that if signals are endogenous but no player has
an incentive to manipulate the signal generating
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process and if the signal contingent strategy is
asymptotically stable, then and only then, the
outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Introduction and Related Lit-
erature
Consider a situation of strategic interaction in which agents
perceive signals before they choose their strateg. Restric-
ing the general setup of Aumann (1974), I demand that all
agents share common prior on the distribution of the sig-
nals. Given their own signal and given the conditional dis-
tribution of their opponents’ signals, each agent optimally
chooses a strategy. Finally, suppose that there is common
knowledge of rationality. According to Aumann (1987), a
resulting outcome must be a correlated equilibrium. Due to
the potential correlation between signals, a correlated equi-
librium does not need to be a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, a
situation of strategic interaction without signals seems arti-
ficial – signals are all around us in the real world, we can
hardly avoid perceiving them and then condition our behav-
ior on them in many situations. For example, in a financial
market agents may receive signals on the value of some asset
that are correlated. Several firms competing on a market for
some consumption good may receive correlated information
on the parametrization of the demand function. Consumers
observe signals displaying information on the quality of some
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good when planning their consumption. Football fans per-
ceive signals concerning the success of their favorite team
within some tournament and condition their betting behav-
ior on this information.
Rationality in the sense of Aumann (1987) requires that
agents understand the underlying probability space and that
this is commonly known. I support the concept of correlated
equilibrium from the perspective of bounded rationality. I
assume evolutionary dynamics on the game in which agents
receive signals and show that states persisting over time in
the presence of small mutations are correlated equilibria –
and therefore may be non-Nash outcomes. Before I describe
our model in detail in the next section, I discuss the con-
cept of evolution. In his survey on adaptive heuristics, Hart
(2005) describes evolutionary dynamics as one extreme of
bounded rationality: individuals’ behavior is completely de-
terministic. The concept of evolutionary game theory origi-
nates from biology; see Dawkins (1990) or Bjo¨rnerstedt and
Weibull (1996) for socio-economic interpretations. Rational-
ity is imposed on an aggregate level: strategies with higher
relative success spread faster. Evolutionary game theory
contributes by showing that even if agents are boundedly
rational, certain outcomes predicted by concepts requiring
rationality persist over time.
This chapter characterizes the set of correlated equilib-
ria that persist over time, given boundedly rational agents.
The first part of the chapter assumes an exogenous and sta-
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tionary process of signal generation. A set of signal con-
tingent strategies is asymptotically stable with respect to
convex monotonic dynamics1, if it is a strict equilibrium set2
of the game with signals. Given this selection, I consider en-
dogenous signals. A signal generating process is robust, if no
population has an incentive to manipulate the process, given
equilibrium choice of the signal contingent strategies. I show
for generic games that a signal contingent strategy is asymp-
totically stable and the signal generating processs is robust,
if and only if the induced outcome is a strict Nash equilib-
rium. For the special case of the traditional example that
has an equilibrium outcome with payoffs outside the convex
hull of Nash-payoffs, the Chicken game, I show that a corre-
lated equilibrium has robust signals if and only if it induces
payoffs that lie inside the convex hull of Nash-payoffs.
In the remainder of this section, I relate this chapter to the
literature. It is well understood that the aggregate can dis-
play some rationality. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) show
that only strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable in
the multipopulation replicator dynamics. For asymmetric
games (animal conflicts), Selten (1980) shows that evolution-
ary stable strategies must be strict Nash equilibria. I make
use of a concept introduced by Balkenborg (1994), strict equi-
librium set. Each element of a strict equilibrium set is a
1Hofbauer and Weibull (1996)
2Balkenborg (1994)
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Nash equilibrium, the set is closed under mixed best replies.
Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) show asymptotic stability of
restpoints within this set for general asymmetric games.3 I
rely on the concept of strict equilibrium set to characterize
sets of correlated equilibria that are asymptotically stable.
Lenzo and Sarver (2006) build up a model of subpopulations
in which agents are matched according to a distribution over
the set of subpopulations. They show that every interior4
Lyapunov stable state is equivalent to a correlated equilib-
rium. Their model is inspired by the work of Mailath et al.
(1997) who show that equilibria in a static model of local in-
teractions coincide with correlated equilibria in the original
game. In both models the correlation device is a “match-
ing technology” with which agents of different populations
are matched non-uniformly. I show that Lenzo and Sarver
(2006) is a special case of our model if one chooses a par-
ticular signal generating process. Cripps (1991) analyzes a
two player model in which in a first stage nature randomly
allocates row or column to the players and in a second step
assigns one role of a finite set of roles to each player. He
shows that an ESS in the symmetric game yields a distri-
3Other setwise concepts defined for symmetric one population games
are introduced by Balkenborg and Schlag (2001) and Thomas (1985).
Cressman (2003) also elaborates on the strict equilibrium set.
4Interiority in the subpopulation model means that the state is in-
terior for each subpopulation. It is more stringent than interiority in
our case.
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bution over the set of outcomes that is a strict correlated
equilibrium. I abstain from analyzing the symmetrization
and extend his model to dynamic analysis. Kim and Wong
(2007) define evolutionary stable correlation for symmetric
2 × 2-games. They apply a special signal space, I discuss
this matter after introducing the static model. Finally, I
consider exogenous signals. I imagine situations, in which
some agents exercise control over the generation of signals. I
do not restrict attention to situations in which a signal con-
sists of a message of each player. In such a case, the player
can manipulate a part of the signal. I consider players who
can replace a signal entirely and model this by considering
the choice of probability distributions over the set of sig-
nal generating elementary events. I characterize the set of
strategies in the original game for evolutionary dynamics of
signalcontingent strategies, if no population has an incentive
to manipulate the signal generating process.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows:
section 2 sets up the model, section 3 lists propositions which
are already available in the literature and which I transfer
to my model to characterize asymptotically stable sets of
correlated equilibria. Section 4 gives some examples. Section
5 shows the generalization of the subpopulation model of
Lenzo and Sarver (2006), section 6 characterizes the set of
stable outcomes that have a robust signal generating process
and the appendix collects the remaining proofs.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 Static Model
We give a brief description of the model before I proceed to
define it formally. At each point of time, nature randomly
draws a tuple of agents from a fixed set of populations. A
signal generating process reveals information to each of the
active agents, this information may be correlated. Each
agent chooses a strategy to interact with the other agents
in a normal form game. Each agent is characterized by a
rule that prescribes the strategic choice given the received
signal. The resulting payoff determines wether the applied
rule spreads in the population.
Let Γ = {N , S, f} be a finite game in normal form
where N = {1, . . . , N} is the set of population, S = ×i∈NSi
and Si = {si1, . . . , simi} is population i’s finite set of pure
strategies and f : S → RN is a utility or fitness func-
tion. Each population consists of infinitely many agents.
Let Σi = ∆(Si) be the set of probability measures on
Si and let Σˆi be a finite subset of Σi that contains the
vertices of Σi. Let Σ = ×i∈IΣi be the set of product
measures on S, define Σˆ = ×i∈IΣˆi accordingly. ∆ = ∆(S)
is the set of all probability measures on S. Denote by
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN) a vector of strategies
without the one of population i and by S−i = ×j∈N\{i}Sj
the Cartesian product of all but i’s strategy spaces. Define
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Σ−i = ×j∈N\{i}Σj and ∆−i = ×j∈N\{i}∆(Sj). I extend f
to the space of mixed strategies, f : Σ → R, defined by
f i(σi, σ−i) =
∑
s∈S f
i(s)
∏
j∈N σ
j(sj) ∀ i ∈ N .
A Strategy si ∈ Si is dominated if there exists some mixed
strategy σi ∈ Σi such that f i(si, σ−i) ≤ f i(σi, σ−i) ∀ σ−i ∈
Σ−i, with strict inequality for at least one σ−i. If the
inequality is strict for all σ−i, si is strictly dominated. It is
immediate to show that if si is dominated then there is a
dominating strategy σi with σi(si) = 0.
A strategy tuple σ = (σi, σ−i) is a Nash Equilibrium
(NE) in Γ, if ∀ i ∈ N , f i(σi, σ−i)−f i(sih, σ−i) ≥ 0 ∀ sih ∈ Si.
Following Aumann (1987), I define a probability space
〈Ω,A, P 〉 which generates signals (that are potentially
correlated) on which agents can condition their strategic
choices. Both, the original game Γ and the probability
space constitute the primitives of my model. Assume Ω to
be a nonempty and finite set of generic elements ω. Let
A be the powerset of Ω and let {Ai}i∈N be a collection of
partitions of Ω. Ai represents an information structure for
population i; if nature draws an elementary event ω ∈ Ω,
population i knows Ai ∈ Ai if and only if ω ∈ Ai. Since for
each population i there may be events ω, ω′ that i cannot
distinguish, the agents are not able to ‘learn’ P . Therefore, I
need to assume P to be a common prior on (Ω,A). I regard
P as an objective statistic environment. Without loss of
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generality, I assume that P (ω) > 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω. All subjectivity
enters the model via the set of partitions {Ai}i∈N . I define
the signaling structure I = { 〈Ω,A, P 〉 , {Ai}i∈N}. I refer
to an element ω ∈ Ω as a complete description of a state
of the world while I call an element Ai ∈ Ai a signal for
the true state of the world. I assume that each agent has
access to some private randomization device that allows for
independent mixing, such that any mixed strategy in Σˆi
is available. Wherever necessary, I assume that Σˆi is rich
enough. Define Ai(ω) = {Ai ∈ Ai | ω ∈ Ai} the information
set available to an agent in population i if nature draws
ω. Throughout the model I make the assumption that the
populations’ fitnesses (represented by f : S ⇒ RN) do not
depend on any ω. This is because I want to show that even
if information is payoff-irrelevant, outcomes that are no
Nash-equilibra of Γ can be stable under boundedly rational
behavior, if agents perceive correlated signals.
Let a rule be a mapping from the set of states to strategies,
ri : Ω → Σˆi. I assume for all i that ri is Ai-measurable, that
is if for some ω, ri(ω) = σi then ri(ω′) = σi ∀ ω′ ∈ Ai(ω).
In words, agents cannot distinguish states that are in the
same information set A. Define as risi(ω) the probability
with which an agent that uses rule ri chooses strategy si
given event ω, that is risi(ω) = σ
i(si), where σi = ri(ω).
Denote the finite set of all rule-profiles by R. I denote
the share of agents in population i applying rule ri by
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ρi(ri), the set of all shares in population i, ρi by ∆(Ri),
the set of all population shares ρ by ∆R = ×
i∈N
∆(Ri).
As before, I denote by r−i the vector r without the ele-
ment ri, and by ρ−i the vector ρ without the element ρi.
Denote by F : ∆R → RN the expected fitness from the
choice of the rules, where the components are defined as
follows: F i(ρ) = ∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)
∑
r∈R
f i(r(w))
∏
j∈N
ρj(rj). Given the
signaling structure I and the normal form game Γ, I call
G(I,Γ) = {N ,R,F} the expansion of Γ.
A rule ri ∈ Ri is strictly dominated if there ex-
ists some population share ρi ∈ ∆(Ri) such that
F i(ri, ρ−i) < F i(ρi, ρ−i) ∀ ρ−i ∈ ∆(R−i).
To get a flavor of the model, I begin the analysis with
a very straight forward result that is helpful to show the
extinction of dominated strategies.
Lemma 1
If strategy si is strictly dominated in Γ by some mixed
strategy σˆi ∈ Σˆi, any rule ri with risi(ω) > 0 for some ω is
strictly dominated in the game G(I,Γ), if Σˆi is rich enough.
Proof
Assume without loss of generality that σˆi(si) = 0. Define for
each ω ∈ Ω the new rule rˆis˜i(ω) = ris˜i(ω)+risi(ω)·σˆi(s˜i) ∀ s˜i 6=
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si and rˆisi(ω) = 0. It is easy to verify that rˆ
i(ω) ∈ Σi ∀ ω,
however I need to assume that Σˆi is rich enough
such that rˆi(ω) ∈ Σˆi ∀ ω. For convenience I define
f i(ri(ω), ρ−i(ω)) =
∑
r−i f
i(ri(ω), r−i(ω))
∏
j 6=i ρ
j(rj). We
then have ∀ ρ−i ∈ ∆R−i :
F i(rˆi, ρ−i) = F i(ri, ρ−i) +∑
ω∈Ω
ri
si
(ω)>0
P (ω)risi
[
f i(σˆi, ρ−i(ω))− f i(si, ρ−i(ω))]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

A strategy si is iteratively strictly dominated in Γ if
there exists a sequence {sit ,Γt}nt=0 such that sit is strictly
dominated in Γt, where Γt is obtained from Γt−1 by removing
sit−1 from it−1’s set of pure strategies in Γt−1, Γ = Γ0 and
si = sin . The same definition applies for a rule ri in the
game G.
As a consequence of Lemma 1 one can state an analo-
gous statement for iteratively strictly dominated rules:
Lemma 2
If strategy si is iteratively strictly dominated in Γ by some
mixed strategy σˆi ∈ Σˆi, any rule ri with risi(ω) > 0 for some
ω is iteratively strictly dominated in the game G(I,Γ), if Σˆi
is rich enough.
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Definition Correlated Equilibrium (c.e.)
Given I, a correlated equilibrium in Γ is a mixed rule ρ ∈ ∆R
such that for all i, F i(ρ) ≥ F i(ρ˜i, ρ−i) ∀ ρ˜i ∈ ∆(Ri) . A
c.e. is strict, if inequalities hold strictly for all ρ˜i 6= ρi and
i ∈ N .
Here, an equilibrium is a point in the set of rules. The
original definition by Aumann (1987) is for distributions on
the space of strategies. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp.
56) for a short discussion. I regard the distribution over the
set of strategies as a result of the model, not a primitive.
Definition Induced Distribution
Let ρ ∈ ∆R be some distribution over the set of rules. Then
I and ρ induce a distribution over the set of outcomes. I
define ∀ s ∈ S:
λ(s) =
∑
ω
P (ω)
∏
i∈N
∑
ri∈Ri
ρi(ri) · risi(ω)
Definition Correlated Equilibrium Distribution
(c.e.d.)
A distribution λ ∈ ∆ induced by I and a c.e. ρ is a
correlated equilibrium distribution.
Given some expanded game G(I,Γ), there may exist
multiple c.e. ρ, some being strict and some other being
non-strict. See Example 5.1 .
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Fix some signal generating process I. Then, a mixed
rule ρ ∈ ∆R is a c.e. in Γ, if and only if ρ is a Nash
equilibrium of expanded game G(I,Γ). I discuss my choice of
the signal space. In an earlier version of this chapter, I had
Ω = S and Ai = {{si×S−i}si}, that is each population gets
a recommendation to play a particular strategy. I call this
signal space direct, Kim and Wong (2007) use this direct
signal space. With direct signals, it is optimal to follow the
recommendation if the signals are distributed according to
a c.e.d. . However, two problems come with this approach:
firstly, even if the distribution of signals P is a c.e.d., it
might still be an equilibrium if the agents deviate from the
recommendation (see example 4.1). Secondly, if one pins
down a special signal generating process, one can always
construct a meta game in which agents can condition their
choice of rules on some extra signals they might receive.
The general formulation of the signal space includes such
extra signals.
Definition Evolutionary Stability (Swinkels (1992))
ρ ∈ ∆R is evolutionary stable in G(I,Γ), if for every rule
profile ρ˜ 6= ρ there exists some ¯ρ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
 ∈ (0, ¯ρ˜), and with ˜˜ρ = ρ˜ + (1− )ρ,
F i(ρi, ˜˜ρ−i) > F i(ρ˜i, ˜˜ρ−i) for some i ∈ N .
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It follows immediately that a rule is evolutionary stable if
and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium of G.5 Note that
the above definition is for multi-population games.
The definitions of evolutionary stable sets by Thomas
(1985), Balkenborg and Schlag (2001) and Cressman (2003)
are all specified for symmetric one population games.
Therefore I do not list them but state a concept for general
asymmetric games:
Definition Strict Equilibrium set (SEset) (Balkenborg
(1994))
A nonempty set F ⊂ ∆R is a strict equilibrium set if
it is a set of Nash equilibria of G that is closed under
mixed-rule best replies by each population i, i.e. if for some
ρ ∈ F , (ρ˜i, ρ−i) ∈ F whenever F i(ρ˜i, ρ−i) = F i(ρ) for each
population i.
Such a set does not need to exist, see Example 5.4.
Theorem (Balkenborg and Schlag (2007)6, Cressman
(2003)7)
If F is an SESet of G, then F is a finite union of faces of
5See Swinkels (1992), Theorem 2.
6Proposition 2, p.299
7Theorem 3.1.2, p.71
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∆R. In particular, F is closed and contains at least one
pure rule r ∈ R.
2.2.2 Dynamic Model
We assume that at each point in time, agents update their
behavior such that the population shares ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
change according to the regular differential equation
ρ˙i(ri) = gi(ri, ρ) · ρi(ri), ∀ ri ∈ Ri, ∀ i ∈ N , (2.1)
where regularity presumes that g = ×i∈N gi is (i)
Lipschitz continuous on ∆R = ×i∈N∆(Ri) and (ii)
gi(·, ρ) · ρi = 0 ∀ρ ∈ ∆R. By the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem8,
there exists a unique solution ρˆ(·, ρ) for each initial condition
ρ ∈ ∆R.
The following definition is taken from Hofbauer and
Weibull (1996):9
8A function φ : X → Rk, where X ⊂ Rk, is (locally) Lipschitz
continuous if for every compact subset C ⊂ X there exists some real
number λ such that it holds for all x, y ∈ C: ||φ(x)−φ(y)|| ≤ λ||x−y||.
If X ⊂ Rk is open and the vector field φ : X → Rk is Lipschitz
continuous, then the system x˙ = φ(x) has a unique solution xˆ(·, x0) :
T → X through every state x0 ∈ X. Moreover, xˆ(t, x0) is continuous
in t ∈ T and x0 ∈ X. (Weibull (1995) pp.232)
9Convex monotonicity is implied by aggregate monotonicity, it is
not implied by and does not imply monotonicity (both Samuelson and
Zhang (1992), Definition 3, p.369)
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(2.1) is convex monotonic (CM), if it satisfies
F i(ri, ρ−i) < F i(ρik, ρ−i) ⇔ gi(ri, ρ) < gi(·, ρ) · ρik ∀ i ∈ N .
(2.1) is the replicator dynamics, if
gi(ri, ρ) = F i(ri, ρ−i)−F i(ρ) ∀ ri ∈ Ri and i ∈ N .
Define ρ+ = {ρ′ ∈ ∆R | ∃ t ∈ R+, ρ′ = ρˆ(t, ρ)}, as the
subset of ∆R that is reached if the dynamics start at ρ.
Definition Stability
A closed set Λ ⊆ ∆R is Lyapunov stable if for every
neighborhood U ′ of Λ there exists a neighborhood U ′′ such
that ρ+ ⊂ U ′ ∀ ρ ∈ U ′′ ∩∆R.
A closed set A ⊆ ∆R is asymptotically stable if it is Lya-
punov stable and if there exists a neighborhood U of A such
that ρˆ(t, ρ) −→
t→∞
A for all ρ ∈ U ∩∆R.
2.3 Propositions
This section collects the propositions.
Proposition 1
Let g be convex monotonic. If F ⊂ ∆R is a Lyapunov stable
set of rest points, then each ρ ∈ F is a c.e. .
Proof: see Appendix A.
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The converse of Proposition 1 is not true in general:
Fix some I and c.e. ρ in which for a population i,
the rule ri ∈ Ri : ρi(ri) > 0 is weakly dominated by
some mixed rule ρ˜i. Then there exists a neighborhood
U of ρ such that ∀ ˜˜ρ = (ρi, ˜˜ρ−i) ∈ U , ˜˜ρ−i ∈ int(∆R−i)
it holds that F i(ri, ˜˜ρ−i) < F i(ρ˜i, ˜˜ρ−i). Therefore, for
some ˜˜ρ−i there exists some rih ∈ Ri with ρ˜i(rih) > 0 such
that F i(rih, ˜˜ρ−i) > F i(ri, ˜˜ρ−i). Since (2.1) is monotonic,
gi(rih, ˜˜ρ) > g
i(ri, ˜˜ρ), contradicting Lyapunov stability.
The next propositions specify the relationship of asymptotic
stability and correlated equilibrium:
Proposition 2 (cf Balkenborg and Schlag (2007), Theorem
6 and Cressman (2003), Theorem 4.5.3)
If a non-empty set F ⊂ ∆(R) of rules ρ is an asymptotically
stable set of rest points under the standard replicator
dynamic, F is a SEset.
Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) and Cressman (2003)
actually show equivalence, if (2.1) is the replicator dynamic.
Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) also show the reverse for a
wide class of other dynamics. I show the reverse for the
distinct class of convex monotone dynamics.10
10In Proposition 13 Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) demand (A) that
gi(ri, ρ) ≥ 0 whenever ri is a best response to ρ−i, (B) that gi(ri, ρ) > 0
whenever ri is a best response to ρ−i but ρi is not and (C) that
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Proposition 3
Let (2.1) be convex monotonic. If a set F is a SEset, then
F is an asymptotically stable set of rest points.
Proof: see Appendix A.
If the process does not start in the interior of ∆R,
there may exist some ρ0 ∈ ∆R such that λ(ρˆ(t, ρ0)) is not a
c.e.d. for all t > 0, even if an asymptotically stable set exists.
Proposition 4 (Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) Theo-
rem 1)
If a rule ri ∈ Ri is iteratively strictly dominated and
the process starts in the interior of the rulespace and if
the selection dynamics (2.1) is convex monotonic, ri gets
eliminated.
We do not give a statement whether induced distribu-
tion over outcomes converges. Viossat (2004) shows for
symmetric 3 × 3-games that the multipopulation replicator
dynamics eliminates all strategies not used in a correlated
gi(ri, ρ) < 0 whenever ρi is a best response to ρ−i but ri is not. Neither
does convex monotonicity imply (A),(B) and (C) nor vice versa. Con-
sider some ρ, ρ˜i and ri such that F i(ρ˜i, ρ−i) > F i(ρ) > F i(ri, ρ−i).
(A),(B),(C) imply that gi(ri, ρ−i) = 0. From regularity I have
ρi · gi(·, ρ) = 0, hence g cannot be convex monotonic.
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equilibrium (with interior initial conditions), however
Viossat (2007) gives an example of a class of symmetric
4 × 4 games for which the replicator dynamics eliminates
all strategies used in correlated equilibrium along interior
solutions. Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 allow me to pin
down a weaker result, namely to rule out iteratively strictly
dominated outcomes in the induced distribution in the long
run.
Corollary
If the process starts in the interior of the rulespace and
if the selection dynamics (2.1) is convex monotonic, then
lim
t→∞
λ(t) attaches zero probability to outcomes s that
involve strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated, if
Σˆ is rich enough.
2.4 Examples
This section demonstrates how the model can be applied to
various examples. The examples are complementary to the
propositions of the preceeding section.
2.4.1 A Coordination Game
This example illustrates that one signal generating process
I allows for multiple stable rules r, r′ that do not induce
the same distribution λ over outcomes S. Even if the signal
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generating process I itself is a distribution over S and is
regarded as a ‘recommendation’, other strategy choices can
well be stable.
Let the game Γ be defined by N = {1, 2}, S = {u, d}×{l, r}
and
f =
l r
u (1,1) (0,0)
d (0,0) (1,1)
.
We specify I with Ω = S, A1 = {{ul, ur}, {dl, dr}},
A2 = {{lu, ld}, {ru, rd}}. A rule for population 1 (row)
assigns a strategy for the first and the second element of
A1 respectively. UD means “choose u if ω ∈ {ul, ur} and
choose d if ω ∈ {dl, dr}”. I analogously denote the rules of
population 2.
Fi =
LL LR RL RR
UU 1 P ({ul, dl}) P ({ur, dr}) 0
UD P ({ul, ur}) P ({ul, dr}) P ({ur, dl}) P ({dl, dr})
DU P ({dl, dr}) P ({dl, ur}) P ({ul, dr}) P ({ul, ur})
DD 0 P ({ur, dr}) P ({ul, dl}) 1
for i = 1, 2
The rules (UU,LL) and (DD,RR) are the strict correlated
equilibria that correspond to the Nash equilibria of the orig-
inal game for any P with full support. Consider P to be
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a uniform measure over Ω. Then, (UD,LR) is a non-strict
c.e.. Even if the signal space Ω equals the set of outcomes
S, the induced distribution λ does not need to coincide with
P , although it still may be a c.e.d . Suppose P ({ul}) = p
and P ({dr}) = 1− p. The pair (DU,RL) is a strict c.e. and
induces the following distribution over the set of outcomes:
λ(ul) = 1− p and λ(dr) = p.
2.4.2 Chicken
A non-Nash outcome may be asymptotically stable.
Consider the “chicken game” originally presented in
Aumann (1974):
Γ =
l r
u (6,6) (2,7)
d (7,2) (0,0)
Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and let A1 =
{{ω1, ω2}, {ω3}} and
A2 = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}, let P (ω) ≡ 13 . Given this I, the
resulting expanded game is
G(Γ,I) =
LL RL LR RR
UU (6,6) (42
3
, 61
3
) (31
3
, 62
3
) (2,7)
UD (61
3
, 42
3
) (5,5) (22
3
, 41
3
) (11
3
, 42
3
)
DU (62
3
, 31
3
) (41
3
, 22
3
) (3,3) (2
3
, 21
3
)
DD (7,2) (42
3
, 11
3
) (21
3
, 2
3
) (0,0)
77
r = (UD,LR) is a strict c.e., hence r is a singleton evo-
lutionary stable rule and therefore asymptotically stable in
any convex monotonic dynamics. As is well known, the pay-
offs generated by r lie outside the convex hull of the Nash
equilibria of the original game Γ.
2.4.3 A SEset of correlated equilibria
The chicken example above shows that a single outcome can
be asymptotically stable producing payoffs that lie outside
the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. This ex-
ample does the same for a set of outcomes. Consider the
following game
Γ =
l r
u (0,0) (0,6)
m (3,-6) (0,0)
d (9,9) (-3,6)
.
The pure Nash equilibria are (u, r), (m, r) and (d, l), the
unique mixed Nash equilibrium is (σ1(m) = 1
3
, σ1(d) =
2
3
, σ2(l) = 1
3
). Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, A1 =
{{ω1, ω2}, {ω3}} ,A2 = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}, P (ω) ≡ 3. Each
population has two signals, the row population therefore has
9 rules, column has 4 rules. The payoff matrix of the ex-
panded game is given by
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F =
LL LR RL RR
UU (0,0) (0,4) (0,2) (0,6)
UM (1,-2) (0,2) (1,0) (0,4)
UD (3,3) (-1,4) (3,5) (-1,6)
MU (2,-4) (1,0) (0,2) (0,2)
MM (3,-6) (1,-2) (2,-4) (0,0)
MD (5,-1) (0,0) (4,1) (-1,2)
DU (6,6) (2,7) (2,5) (-2,6)
DM (7,4) (2,5) (3,3) (-2,4)
DD (9,9) (1,7) (5,8) (-3,6)
.
In the figure, the shaded triangle is the convex hull of the
Nash equilibrium payoffs of Γ, the thick line connecting
the points (2, 5) and (2, 7) represents the SEset F = {ρ ∈
∆(R) | ρ1(DM) = 1 − ρ1(DU), ρ2(LR) = 1}, which is not
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fully contained in the convex hull.
2.4.4 Matching Pennies
Non-existence of SEset.
Consider the original two population game with strategies
{h, t}2 and payoff matrix
Γ =
h t
h (1,-1) (-1,1)
t (-1,1) (1,-1)
Let the information structure be given by a singleton Ω =
{ω}, in other words let there be no signals. Therefore the
rules coincide with the strategies. The set of Nash equilibria
of G has only one element which is not strict (and hence is
not closed under mixed-rule best replies). In fact, any in-
formation structure I = { 〈Ω,A, P 〉 , {Ai}i∈N} that has a
common prior induces an expanded game G{I,Γ} which has
no SEset. If instead of P there would exist some subjective
priors {P i}i∈I with P i : Ai → R violating the common prior
assumption, it would be straightforward to construct an ex-
pansion of Γ with strict equilibria, see Aumann and Dreze
(2005), example 6.5 .
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2.5 Subpopulations
In this section, I illustrate that the model of Lenzo and
Sarver (2006) can be expressed as a special case of the gen-
eral formulation of the model presented in this thesis. I give
a special interpretation of the signals: a signal assigns one of
finitely many subpopulations to each agent. Let each popu-
lation i have a set of subpopulations M i = {mi1, . . . ,mi|M i|},
defining M = ×
i∈N
M i. Denote by xm
i
si the share of agents in
subpopulation mi that choose strategy si. Let η ∈ ∆(M) be
a probability distribution over M , with η(mi, ·) > 0 ∀mi ∈
M i and i ∈ N . Note that this distribution may be corre-
lated and that there may be matches m ∈ M that receive
zero-probability.
We show that given a game Γ, for any M, η with state
x, there is an I and a state ρ such that the induced distri-
butions are the same. I therefore can represent any state
x of the subpopulations model by a state ρ of our model if
I give a particular specification of the signalling structure.
Furthermore I show that ρ needs not to be unique and that
the dynamic properties of x and ρ need not be the same.
Let Ω = M , Ai = {{mi × M−i}mi∈M i}, P =
η and ρi(ri) =
∏
mi∈M i
xm
i
ri(mi).
11 First I show that
11More precisely: ri(mi) = ri(mi,m−i) for some m−i (ri(mi,m−i)
has the same value ∀ m−i).
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∑
ri∈Ri ρ
i(ri) = 1. Note that
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi1)=s
i
∏
mi∈M i
mi 6=mi1
xm
i
ri(mi) =
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi1)=s
i
h
∏
mi∈M i
mi 6=mi1
xm
i
ri(mi) ∀ si, sih ∈ Si.
∑
ri∈Ri
ρi(ri) =
∑
ri∈Ri
∏
mi∈M i
xm
i
ri(mi)
=
∑
si∈Si
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi1)=s
i
x
mi1
si
∏
mi∈M i
mi 6=mi1
xm
i
ri(mi)
=
(∑
si∈Si
x
mi1
si
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi1)=s
i
h
∏
mi∈M i
mi 6=mi1
xm
i
ri(mi)
...
=
∑
si∈Si
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi1) = s
i
h
...
ri(mi|M i|−1) = s
i
h
ri(mi|M i|) = s
i
∏
mi∈M i
mi 6= mi1
...
mi 6= mi|M i|−1
mi = mi|M i|
x
mi|Mi|
si
=
∑
si∈Si
x
mi|Mi|
si
· 1
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Now I calculate λ(s) for some s ∈ S:
λ(s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)
∏
i∈N
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(ω)=si
ρi(ri)
=
∑
m∈M
η(m)
∏
i∈N
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi)=si
∏
mik∈M i
x
mik
ri(mik)
=
∑
m∈M
η(m)
∏
i∈N
xm
i
si
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi)=si
∏
mik∈M i
mi
k
6=mi
x
mik
ri(mik)
From the third line of the calculation of
∑
ri∈Ri
ρi(ri) I know
that
∑
ri∈Ri
ri(mi)=si
∏
mik∈M i
mi
k
6=mi
x
mik
ri(mik)
= 1 and have the desired result that
the distributions over outcomes are the same. However, there
is no one-to-one mapping from one model to the other model.
Consider the following simple example with M = M1×M2 =
{m11,m12}×{m21,m22}, S = {s11, s12}×{s21, s22}, η(m) = 14 ∀m ∈
M , x
mi1
si1
= x
mi2
si2
= 1, in words: for each population i all agents
of subpopulation 1 choose their strategy 1 and all agents
from subpopulation 2 choose their strategy 2. If Ω = M ,
A1 = {{(m11,m21), (m11,m22)}, {(m12,m21), (m12,m22)}} (and A2
analogous), P = η and ρ as constructed above, I have prob-
ability mass one on the rule ri : ri(mi1) = s
i
1, r
i(mi2) = s
i
2.
Alternatively, but for the same Ω, Ai, P , I could assign
ρ˜i(ri) = 1
4
∀ ri ∈ Ri. Both ρ and ρ˜ induce the same dis-
tribution λ but while ρ is pure, ρ˜ is completely mixed and
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therefore ρ and ρ˜ have different dynamic properties.
2.6 Robust Signals
Until now, I assumed that the signal generating process is
stationary. This is plausible, if the signals originate from
an object that is completely exogenous, i.e. if they are
independent from interaction – a somehow polar case. The
other polar case would be that the agents themselves can
choose messages that serve as signals. I regard situations
in which one population i can alter the complete signal
and consider the case in which population i can choose a
particular probability distribution P . I offer the following
interpretation: suppose some institution determines P .
Every population knows the design of the institution and
therefore has access to the information how the institution
determines P . Population i can influence the institution,
because – for example – some key positions within the
institution are held by members of population i. In this
section I derive conditions such that population i does not
have an incentive to change P in a stable state ρ. Suppose
nature draws a certain elementary event ω ∈ Ω. Then, for a
given distribution of rules ρ = {ρi}i, population i’s expost
payoff is f i(ρ(ω)). Population i has an incentive to change
P if there is some other event ω′ with f i(ρ(ω)) < f i(ρ(ω′)).
This leads to the following definition:
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Definition Robust to Manipulation
Given ρ, P ∈ ∆(Ω) is robust to manipulation if for all
populations i
P (ω) > 0 ⇒ f i(ρ(ω)) ≥ f i(ρ(ω′)) ∀ω′ ∈ Ω .
If a distribution P is robust to manipulation given ρ, no pop-
ulation (regardless wether it has the capability to change P
or not) has an incentive to manipulate P . I do not demand
that any population can change P . I characterize those pairs
(P, ρ) such that no population wants to change P given ρ.
Nevertheless, I implicitly assumed some constrained reason-
ing. Suppose there is some mapping g : ∆(Ω) ⇒ ∆(R)
such that given distribution P , agents play an equilibrium
ρ ∈ g(P ). In the approach above, agents believe g to
be singlevalued and constant and agents compare the ex-
post payoffs. Alternatively, one could argue that popu-
lation i does not have an incentive to change P to P ′ if
F iP (ρ) ≥ F iP ′(ρ′) ∀ ρ′ ∈ g(P ′). That is, no population has
an incentive to change P , if P maximizes ex-ante payoffs for
all equilibrium choices ρ′, where the equilibrium choice well
depends on the distribution P . The consequences of this def-
inition are more exclusive in the sense that it is easy to find
a game such that no stable state ρ has a robust distribution
P .12
12For example, the chicken game, the battle of the sexes game,...
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2.6.1 Results
Consider again the general setting, with Γ = {N , S, f},
I = {{Ω,P(Ω), P}, {A}i∈N} yielding the expanded game
GP = {N ,R,FP} (making the dependence on P explicit).
Define ∆∼P ⊂ ∆(R) as the set of rules ρ such that P is
robust to manipulation. Define ∆CEP ⊂ ∆(R) as the set of
correlated equilibria given P . Our first result is immediate:
Proposition 5
∆∼P ∩∆CEP 6= ∅ ∀ P ∈ ∆(Ω).
Proof
Consider a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ ∆(S) of the original
game Γ. Define the rule ρ such that for all i ∈ N and
si ∈ Si, ρi(ri) = σi(si) for ri : ri(ω) ≡ si. Clearly, ρ is a
correlated equilibrium of Γ given P , hence ρ ∈ ∆CEP . No
population conditions the choice of strategies on signals,
hence f i(ρ(ω)) = f i(σ) ∀ω ∈ Ω and therefore no population
has an incentive to manipulate the generation of the signals.
Hence, P is robust given ρ, ρ ∈ ∆∼P . 
We argue that there always is a trivial correlated equilibrium
in which agents choose Nash equilibrium strategies ignoring
any signals. Since all agents ignore any signals, no agent
has an incentive to manipulate the signals.
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We cannot give a full characterization of ∆∼P ∩ ∆CEP ,
the set of correlated equilibria given P that induce P to
be robust against manipulation. However, I suspect that
it is a subset of rules that induce a distribution λ on the
set of outcomes S that lies in the convex hull of Nash
equilibria (see the Chicken Game example below). I leave
this characterization to future work.
We can give a full characterization of ∆∼P ∩ FP , FP
being an asymptotically stable set of rules given P if I
impose a further assumption on the payoffs of the original
game Γ. Suppose Γ is generic13. Then all asymptotically
stable sets are singleton. In this case, I can state that a
probability measure P is robust to manipulation given ρ if
and only if ρ puts probability one on rules that choose one
strict Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Suppose for each population i, the frequency ρi(ri) updates
according to (2.1) and that (2.1) is convex monotonic.
Suppose further that the original game Γ is generic. A
set FP ⊂ ∆(R) is asymptotically stable given (2.1) and a
distribution P with full support on Ω, and P is robust given
a ρ ∈ FP , if and only if ρ attaches probability one to a rule
that maps all signals to the same strict Nash equilibrium.
13fi(s) 6= fi(s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′.
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Proof
Suppose FP is asymptotically stable and suppose P
is robust given any ρ ∈ FP . According to Proposition
2, FP is a SEset, from genericity follows that FP is
singleton, i.e. ρ = FP puts probability one to a strict
correlated equilibrium r ∈ R. Because no population has
an incentive to manipulate P given r, it must be that
f i(r(ω)) = f i(r(ω′)) ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,∀ i. Since Γ is generic,
it must be r(ω) = r(ω′) = s ∀ ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and some
s ∈ S. Since r is a strict correlated equilibrium, I have
F i(r(ω)) > F i(r˜i(ω), r−i(ω)) ∀ r˜i 6= ri,∀ ω,∀ i ⇒ f i(s) >
f i(s˜i, s−i) ∀ s˜i ∈ Si, ∀ i. I conclude that s is a strict Nash
equilbrium of Γ.
Suppose ρ attaches probability one to a rule r ∈ R that
maps all signals to a strict Nash equilibrium s ∈ S of Γ,
r(ω) = s ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Then f i(r(ω)) = f i(r(ω′)) ∀ ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,∀ i
and no population has an incentive to manipulate P . Fur-
ther F i(r) > F i(r˜i, r−i)) ∀r˜i ∈ Ri ∀ i, ie r is a strict
correlated equilbrium. From Proposition 3, r is asymptoti-
cally stable. 
Proposition 6 claims that if the game Γ is generic, i.e.
if one considers the payoffs as random draws and disregards
those payoffs that appear with probability zero, if the agents
update their rules boundedly rational and if no population
would have an incentive to change the signal generating
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process if it could, then there is nothing I can learn from
the concept of correlated equilibrium. Strict Nash equilibria
sufficiently explain behavior under such conditions. The
proof makes use of the fact that in generic games no two
outcomes provide the same payoff. If a population has the
capacity to choose certain signals at will, the population
will do so as to maximize ex post payoffs.
2.6.2 Example: Chicken Game
We elaborate on this subject for the Chicken example, for
which I can characterize ∆∼P ∩ ∆CEP . Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}
and A1 = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3}} and A2 = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}. Con-
sider a P ∈ ∆(Ω) with full support. The Chicken game
is generic, all asymptotically stable sets are singleton and
therefore strict correlated equilibria. I list the expected
payoffs and the best replies in Appendix B. For any P ,
there exist two strict correlated equilibria: (uu, rr) and
(dd, ll). If P (ω1) > max
{
1− 3P (ω3), 13 − 13P (ω3)
}
, also
(ud, rl) is a strict correlated equilibrium. If further P (ω1) >
max
{
1− 3
2
P (ω3),
2
3
− 2
3
P (ω3)
}
, there exists a fourth strict
correlated equilibrium: (du, lr). The equilibria (uu, rr) and
(dd, ll) correspond to the two strict Nash equilibria of Γ.
In these equilibria, ex ante payoffs F equal ex post pay-
offs f(ω) for any signal ω, no population has an incentive
to manipulate the generation of signals. Suppose P is such
that (ud, rl) is a strict equilibrium. Then, the ex ante pay-
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offs for population 1 are 6 − 4P (ω1) + P (ω3). Population 1
has an incentive to increase P (ω3) at the expense of P (ω1).
After the manipulation, either P is outside the region in
which (ud, rl) is a strict correlated equilibrium or the in-
centives to manipulate P are still intact. Note that pop-
ulation 2 also has incentives to manipulate P in the equi-
librium (ud, rl). Analogous arguments hold for the equilib-
rium (du, lr). Wrapping up I get that P is robust given
the rules r ∈ {(uu, ll), (dd, rr)} and that these are the only
states that are asymptotically stable. Note that there are
other correlated equilibria, that are not asymptotically sta-
ble, that are generated by a robust P : ∆∼P ∩ ∆CEP = {ρ ∈
∆(R) |ρ1 = (1
3
+ ρ1(rr), 1
3
− ρ1(dd), 1
3
− ρ1(dd), ρ1(dd)), ρ2 =
(1
3
+ ρ2(rr), 1
3
− ρ2(rr), 1
3
− ρ2(rr), ρ2(rr)), ρ1(dd), ρ2(rr) ∈
[0, 1
3
]}∪{(uu, rr), (dd, ll)}. For any mixed correlated equilib-
rium ρ with a robust P , each population gets a payoff of 42
3
,
which is the outcome of the mixed Nash-equilibrium of the
original Chicken game. I conclude for the Chicken game: if
agents have the capability to influence the signal generating
process, and if the distriution P and the distribution of rules
ρ is such that agents do neither have an incentive to manip-
ulate the signals nor to change their behavior, the outcome
is a Nash outcome.
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2.7 Conclusions
In Aumann (1987), section 3, a player receives a signal and
conditions her strategic choice within a normal form game
on this signal. She takes into account that other players
receive signals that are potentially correlated to hers and
calculates conditional beliefs. Aumann (1987) shows that, if
players have a common prior on the signal space and if play-
ers choose strategies optimally given their beliefs, the equi-
librium outcome is a correlated equilibrium. There are cor-
related equilibrium outcomes that lie outside the convex hull
of the Nash outcomes. In this chapter I pursue the question
whether agents can achieve a correlated equilibrium without
being capable to calculate conditional expectations, indeed
even without being able to optimize. For this purpose, given
a signal generating process and a game in strategic form, I
define an “expanded game” whose strategies are mappings
from the set of the signals to the set of the strategies of the
original game. For this expanded game I transfer existing
and well established results on regular monotonic dynam-
ics, including the replicator dynamic. Applying a result of
Samuelson and Zhang (1992), it follows that an outcome
which supports a strictly dominated strategy of the original
game receives zero weight in the limit. Analogous to results
of Weibull (1995) and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) I show
that a Lyapunov stable state of the expanded game repre-
sents a correlated equilibrium of the original game and that
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such a state is asymptotically stable if and only if it repre-
sents a strict correlated equilibrium (also Swinkels (1992)).
Furthermore, I make use of the setwise concept “strict equi-
librium set” introduced by Balkenborg (1994) and transfer
the result from Cressman (2003) and Balkenborg and Schlag
(2007) to my model that a set of restpoints is asymptotically
stable if and only if it is a strict correlated equilibrium set.
Therefore I can give a positive answer to our initial question:
even if agents are extreme boundedly rational a non-Nash
outcome can be robust to random perturbations if agents
use simple rules that condition their behavior on observed
signals. Finally I discuss endogenous signals. If behavior of
the agents can be modelled by convex monotonic dynamics
and if the game is generic, I show that an asymptotically
stable state has a robust distribution of signals if and only
if it corresponds to a strict Nash equilibrium of the original
game. I suspect that if the (potentially only Lyapunov sta-
ble) state is a correlated equilibrium and if the distribution
of signals is robust, then the expected payoffs lie in the con-
vex hull of those produced by Nash equilibria. I illustrate
this claim for the Chicken game.
This is not the first attempt linking evolutionary concepts
to that of correlated equilibria. Cripps (1991) constructs a
model in which nature randomly assigns roles to players in
bi-matrix games. Analyzing the statics of the model, he
shows that ESS in the symmetrized game represent strict
correlated equilibria. Lenzo and Sarver (2006) define a model
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of subpopulations in which an agent of some subpopulation
is non-uniformly matched to agents in other subpopulations.
I show that any kind of their subpopulation matching may
be represented by a particular signalling structure of our
model. Kim and Wong (2007) define an evolutionary stable
correlated strategy for symmetric 2× 2 games.
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Chapter 3
Persistent Ideologies
I analyse finite normal form games with two play-
ers in which agents are unable to observe payoffs.
Instead of knowing the true payoffs, an agent be-
lieves in an ideology that specifies a virtual payoff
matrix of the game. I define the set of ideologies
that are (strongly) equivalent to the true payoffs.
I may, but do not need to assume the presence of
ideologies that are equivalent to the true payoffs.
There may be infinitely many different ideologies
present at the same time. Given a diversity of
ideologies, agents maximize and choose actions.
I define an equilibrium concept and prove exis-
tence. I assume equilibrium play at each point in
time, however I refrain from assuming a particu-
lar equilibrium selection. Based on this setup, I
define an evolutionary dynamic on the distribu-
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tion of ideologies within the population. In this
meta game agents adapt new ideologies. I assume
a payoff monotonic imitation dynamic, i.e. ide-
ologies that lead to actions which are relatively
successful in terms of true payoffs spread faster in
the population than ideologies that recommend
relatively unsuccessful actions. I characterize the
set of stable distributions on the space of ide-
ologies. For general finite 2 player normal form
games with a Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies I show that there is an open set of ide-
ologies being not equivalent to the true payoffs
that is not selected against by evolutionary pay-
off monotonic dynamics based on the true payoffs
of the game. I illustrate these results for generic
2× 2-games.
3.1 Introduction and Related Lit-
erature
Suppose rational agents meet to interact in a strategic situ-
ation and none of them has verifiable information about the
payoffs of the game. Instead, each agent has been social-
ized by some ideology that specifies a payoff matrix. Agents
then play the game as to maximise the believed payoffs. To
give an example, consider a measure taken to prevent terror-
ist attacks in airplanes: passengers are not allowed to bring
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flasks with their hand luggage that can contain more than
100 ml of liquid. Since this measure was taken until now, no
catastrophe was caused by a large amount of liquid in the
hand luggage. The reason for this could be that the measure
is indeed successful. Another reasoning could be that 150
ml of liquid in a single bottle is no threat to an airplane, in
other words that the measure is useless. In this paper the
view is taken that there is no objective knowledge on this
matter, because the real payoffs are not observable, maybe
not even available. Instead, interacting agents believe in cer-
tain payoffs. To stay in the example, some agents might feel
more secure and therefore more comfortable while airborne;
other agents might be annoyed due to the security restric-
tions and additional waiting times. I do not claim that a
particular position is true or false (actually, as the modeller
of the problem I assume that certain payoffs are true). I
aim to show that even if some perception of reality is wrong,
there might be no selection against this perception based on
the true payoffs.
In this paper I model an ideology as a bias by which the
true payoffs are perturbed. I allow for an unbounded con-
tinuum of biases, that is for any two player game with fi-
nite strategy space there may exist several groups of agents
at the same time, each group believing to face a different
strategic setting. Once in a while, agents change their ide-
ology, however I assume they do so boundedly rational and
model the adaptation of ideologies with an evolutionary pay-
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off monotonic process: ideologies that result in behavior that
produces relatively high real payoffs spread faster within the
population. Sandholm (2001) constructs a similar model for
symmetric 2 × 2-games in which the payoffs of some action
are biased, I build upon this model by allowing for biases
for outcomes of the game. I focus less on the dynamic that
yields equilibrium behavior, but assume equilibrium behav-
ior explicitly. I hereby gain tractability of the model and
can study general finite normal form games instead of sym-
metric 2×2-games. Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) construct
a model in which agents either know the true payoffs of a
symmetric game or maximize some alternative symmetric
utility function, while they allow for the presence of only one
such alternative utility function. For symmetric two player
games they show global stability of states in which all agents
maximize the true payoffs, if – among other conditions – the
payoff function is strictly concave. It is exactly this “stan-
dard property” that turns out to be crucial for their results.
As a special result for the general model I show that for any
2×2-game there is an open set of ideologies that survive in an
evolutionary scenario and represent preferences that are not
equivalent to the preferences represented by the true payoffs
of the game. I give an example for a symmetric 3× 3 game
that confirms this result. Symmetric 2-player games with a
unique pure strategy equilibrium were also studied by Heifetz
et al. (2007) within in a similar framework. Ok and Vega-
Redondo (2001) state that behavioral distinguishability is
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necessary for the fact that agents who maximize the evo-
lutionary relevant payoffs have an evolutionary advantage.
However, this property is not sufficient: for some asymmet-
ric games I show survival of nonindividualistic preferences,
even if they are behaviorally distinguishable. I do so right
away for a simple example, to provide a flavor of my model.
Consider the well known matching pennies game. Suppose
that the row population has agents of three types. One third
knows the true payoffs. Another third has a bias towards
“(head, head)”, the last third is biased towards “(tail, tail)”.
I depict the biases below:
H T
H (-1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1,1)
original payoffs
H T
H (-1+1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1,1)
H T
H (-1,1) (1,-1)
T (1,-1) (-1+1,1)
bias for
1
3
of row bias for
1
3
of row
Each agent knows the sum of the true payoffs and her bias,
and knows the distribution of biases within the population.
Suppose the column population mixes equally between heads
and tails. Then, head-biased agents optimally choose head,
tail-biased agents optimally choose tail while those agents
who know the true payoffs are just indifferent (assume they
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mix equally between heads and tails). In this situation no
agent has an incentive to deviate. Any agent gets the same
real payoffs on average. Moreover, any type has different
equilibrium behavior.
Ely and Yilankaya (2001) study which set of outcomes is
supported by stable preferences in normal form games. As
they rely on static concepts to infer stability properties,1 I
define a dynamic process explicitely to analyze stability is-
sues. In their model, any set of alternative payoff specifica-
tions that is robust to exogenous shocks implies equilibrium
behavior that produces a probability distribution over the
set of Nash equilibria. However, Ely and Yilankaya (2001)
do not have results for the case in which there is zero mass
on ideologies that represent the true preferences. I do not
need to assume the presence of “true” ideologies to prove my
results.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 The Stage Game
We consider two infinite populations of agents from which at
each point of continuous time, a pair (one agent from each
population) is uniformly and independently randomly drawn
to play a finite two player normal form game G. An agent
1We feel uncomfortable accepting their definition 3.1 of stability
which I would rather call a steady state property.
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of population i chooses an element si of the finite strategy
set Si with cardinality ni. The true payoffs are represented
by the ni × nj matrix U i, where U i(si, sj) denotes i’s util-
ity from the outcome generated by (si, sj). I assume that
agents believe to be unable to observe the true payoffs. For
each population i, each agent is characterized by a vector
of parameters θi = {θi(s)}s∈S that describes how an agent
of type θi perceives the structure of the game. An agent
θi then believes to play a game that specifies her payoffs
as ui(s, θi) = U i(si, sj) + θi(si, sj), si ∈ Si, sj ∈ Sj. Let
u be extended to the space of mixed strategies and define
ui((si, σj), θi) =
∑
sj∈Sj σ
j(sj)(U i(si, sj) + θi(si, sj)).
I will show that depending on the game, some ideologies
that specify non-equivalent payoffs won’t have a long-run
evolutionary disadvantage in comparison with true payoff
equivalent ideologies.
We assume that for each population i types are distributed
among the agents by some atomless density fi : R(ni·nj) →
R+ with cumulative distribution function Fi : R(ni·nj) →
[0, 1]. The types are independently distributed across popu-
lations. We assume that {F}i is common knowledge.
Equivalent Ideologies
An agent with parameters θi(s) = 0 ∀ s ∈ S plays the game
given the true payoffs. These payoffs represent the evolu-
tionary relevant payoffs.
There is an affine subset of R(ni·nj) of parameters θi that
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also represent these evolutionary relevant preferences. Fix
some real payoffs U i. Any positive affine transformation
Uˆ i(s) = αi + βi · U i(s), βi > 0 of these payoffs yields other
equivalent payoffs.
We call an ideology θi equivalent to the payoffs U i of
the original unbiased game, if sign{U i(s) − U i(s′)} =
sign{ui(s, θi) − ui(s′, θi)} ∀ s, s′ ∈ S. I call some ideology
θi strongly equivalent to U i, if there is some αi and some
positive βi such that ui(s, θi) = αi + βi · U i(s) ∀ s ∈ S.
If all agents had equivalent ideologies, the Nash equilibria
would be qualitatively maintained, that is any strict equilib-
rium would be the same, a mixed Nash equilibrium would be
offset. If all agents followed strongly equivalent ideologies,
the original Nash equilibria of the game would be exactly
maintained.
Equilibrium
Suppose some agent of population i believes σj to
be the probability distribution over the strategies of
population j 6= i. An agent of type θi chooses si iff
si ∈ arg maxui((s˜i, σj), θi). I assume that in equilibrium,
for all i, all agents of population i hold the same belief σj.
This assumption is critical to the concept I develop in the
following and therefore also to the results of this chapter.
Nevertheless, note that it is not as ad hoc as it might
seem at first sight. The beliefs are about something that
is unobservable – like preferences, ideologies or tastes. The
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belief is defined as a probability measure on something that
is verifiable: actual actions taken by opponents. Since all
agents observe this information, homogeneous beliefs seem
natural.
The set of types Θsi(σ
j) that choose strategy si are
defined as
Θsi(σ
j) := {θi ∈ R(ni·nj) | si ∈ arg maxui((s˜i, σj), θi)}
Any belief σj defines such a set Θsi(σ
j) uniquely.
Lemma for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, given any σj ∈ ∆(Sj)
there is no si ∈ Si such that Θsi(σj) = ∅.
Proof
Fix a constant K > max
si∈Si
|U i(si, σj)|. The max is well defined
since S is finite. Then the bias θi with θi(si, sj) = K
and θi(s˜i, sj) = −K for s˜i 6= si imposes the choice of si,
since ui((si, σj), θi) = U i(si, σj) + K > U i(s˜i, σj) − K =
ui((s˜i, σj), θi) ∀ s˜i 6= si. There is an open set Θ˜i around θi
such that si is optimal for all θi ∈ Θ˜i. Therefore, Θsi(σj)
cannot be empty. 
The lemma states that for any strategy si an agents
virtual payoff matrix can be biased so strongly towards si
such that the agent believes to maximize his payoffs by
choosing si.
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If all agents of population j share the same belief σi,
the true probability of facing some opponent of population
j choosing sj is:
Fj(Θsj(σ
i)) :=
∫
Θ
sj
(σi)
Fj(dθ
j)
Lemma
Fj(Θsj(σ
i)) is continuous in σi ∀ sj, i.
Proof: see Appendix C.
Proposition Existence
There exists at least one pair of beliefs σ = (σi, σj) such
that σi(si) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) ∀si ∈ Si, i 6= j = 1, 2.
Proof:
To prove the result I apply Brouwer’s Fixed Point
Theorem: any continuous function G : Σ → Σ has
a fixed point b∗ ∈ Σ such that G(b∗) = b∗, where
Σ = ∆(S1) × ∆(S2). σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ. Define
gisi(σ
j) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) ∀ σj ∈ Σj, ∀ si ∈ Si and ∀ i, j, i 6= j.
The function g(σ) = (g1(σ2), g2(σ1)) maps from Σ to Σ.
The lemma above states that gisi(σ
j) is continuous in σj for
all si. Therefore, all requirements are met and I can apply
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem to proof existence. 
We assume that in equilibrium j’s belief that i plays si,
σi(si), and the true probability that i plays si, Fi(Θsi(σ
j)),
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coincide: σi(si) = Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) ∀ si ∈ Si, i = 1, 2. Given a
cdf F , I call a collection {Θsi}si∈Si,i=1,2 that satisfies this
equilibrium condition equilibrium set. There may be many
σ = (σ1, σ2) that satisfy such equalities, the assumption is
not as innocent as it might seem: in fact I assume that the
agents manage to coordinate on one of potentially many
equilibria. However, I do not select any equilibrium; my
results require only that the agents coordinate on some, but
not on which equilibrium.2 Note that a distribution on the
set of outcomes S induced by an equilibrium set Θs and a
cdf F does not need to be a Nash equilibrium distribution.
Evolutionary Dynamics
Given some density f with cdf F and some equilibrium set
{Θs}s, agents of population i with type θi ∈ Θsi receive true
payoffs U i(si, Fj) =
∑
sj U
i(si, sj)Fj(Θsj). I assume that
once in a while agents adopt different ideologies and that
this dynamic process can be captured by the deterministic
differential equation
F˙i(Θ
i) =
∫
Θi
gi(θ
i, F,Θs(F ))fi(θ
i)dθi , ∀Θi ∈ Bi, i = 1, 2
where gi(θ
i, F,Θs) is the growth rate of the marginal density
fi at θ
i given cdf F and some equilibrium set Θs and
2Implicitly, I assume that behavior adjusts with infinite speed.
Sandholm (2001) shows in a symmetric 2×2-games setting, that the
infinite speed dynamics can be expressed as the limit of finite speed
dynamics.
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Bi is the Borel σ-algebra of Rni . I require gi(θi, F,Θs)
to maintain the probability property of the marginals
(f1, f2), that is
∫
R2 gi(θ
i, F,Θs)fi(θ
i)dθi = 0, i = 1, 2
and I require gi(θ
i, F,Θs) to be Lipschitz continu-
ous in F . Then, as Oechssler and Riedel (2001)
show, for any F (0) a solution F (t) exists. If
gi(θ
i, F,Θs) = U
i(si, Fj) −
∑
sˆi Fi(Θsˆi) · U i(sˆi, Fj),
the dynamics is the well known replicator dynam-
ics. I assume that g(θ, F,Θs) fulfills the less de-
manding requirement of payoff monotonicity, that is
gi(θ
i, F,Θs) > gi(θˆ
i, F,Θs) ⇔ U i(si, Fj) > U i(sˆi, Fj) for
θi ∈ Θsi and θˆi ∈ Θsˆi .
Let ||F − F ′|| denote the variational norm: ||F − F ′|| =
suph
∣∣∫
Rni·nj h(θ)(f(θ)− f ′(θ))dθ
∣∣, where the supremum is
taken over all measurable functions h : Rni·nj → R satisfying
supθ |h(θ)| ≤ 12 .3
As in Oechssler and Riedel (2001)’s remark, I discuss
the relation of the variational norm to the concept of
mutations in evolutionary game theory. Consider a cdf F
that has measure zero on some set Θ. Now suppose a small
group (of size 
1+
> 0), that has a cdf F ′ with measure
one on Θ enters the population. The new distribution is
F  = (1−) ·F + ·F ′ and has distance  from F . Therefore,
3We take the definition of the variational norm from Oechssler and
Riedel (2001).
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if the group of entering mutants is relatively small, the
distribution changes only little. Consider instead that the
original distribution F has mass one on a single point θ and
that each agent changes his belief of the payoffs only a little,
say to θ+  · ι such that the new distribution F  has measure
one on θ +  · ι.4 Then, F and F  have distance 1, which
is the maximal distance. That means, if all agents mutate,
even very little, the measure of change of the distribution
is maximal; if only a very small fraction of the population
mutates, even very starkly, the measure of change is very
small.
3.2.2 Results
Definition
Let F ∗ be a restpoint satisfying F˙ ∗i (Θ) = 0 ∀ Θ ∈ B, i = 1, 2.
Then F ∗ is called Lyapunov stable if ∀  > 0 ∃ η > 0 :
||Fi(0)− F ∗i || < η ∀ i⇒ ||Fi(t)− F ∗i || <  ∀ t > 0,∀ i.
Definition An equilibrium set {Θs}s is dynamically
stable with respect to some cdf F , if F is Lyapunov stable
and {Θs}s is an equilibrium set given F .
Theorem
Let {Θs}s be dynamically stable with respect to some cdf F .
Then σ with σi(s
i) = Fi(Θsi) ∀ si ∈ Si is a Nash equilibrium.
4ι = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
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Proof
F is Lyapunov stable. Therefore, F˙i(Θ) = 0 ∀Θ ∈ B(Rni·nj)
and Fi(Θsi) > 0 ⇒ gi(θi, F, {Θs}) = 0 ∀ θi ∈ Θsi . Hence
U i(si, σj) = U i(s˜i, σj) ∀ si, s˜j : Fi(Θsi), Fi(Θs˜i) > 0,
with σj(sj) = Fj(Θsj) ∀ sj ∈ Sj. It remains to show:
U i(si, σj) ≥ U i(s˜i, σj) ∀ si : Fi(Θsi) > 0, s˜i : F (Θs˜i) =
0 ⇔ gi(θi, F, {Θs}) ≥ gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}) ∀ θi ∈ Θsi : Fi(Θsi) >
0,∀ θ˜i ∈ Θs˜i : Fi(Θs˜i) = 0. I prove the claim by con-
tradiction. Suppose instead ∃Θs˜i : Fi(Θs˜i) = 0 and
gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}) > 0 ∀θ˜i ∈ Θs˜i . Define F s˜i as the set of cdf’s
F η satisfying F ηi (Θ) = (1− η) · Fi(Θ) ∀Θ ⊂ Rni·nj \Θs˜i and
F ηi (Θs˜i) = η,  ≥ η > 0 and F ηj such that ||Fj − F ηj || ≤ η.
I note that ||Fi − F ηi || = η and that F  is a connected
subset of cdf’s satisfying ||F − F˜ || ≤  ∀ F˜ ∈ F  and
that there is a sequence {F η}η in F  with lim
η→0
F η = F .
Since gi(·, F, ·) is (Lipschitz-) continuous in F , I have
gi(θ˜i, F˜ , {Θs}s) > 0 ∀θ˜i ∈ Θs˜i , ∀F˜ ∈ F s˜i if I choose  > 0
small enough. Consider some F η ∈ F s˜i . I have F˙ ηi (Θs˜i) > 0.
Therefore, for some t > 0 there is some η′ > η such that
F η(t) = F η
′
. Since η ≤ , there is some t > 0 such that
for some η < , F η(t) = F η
′
with η′ > . This contradicts
the property of Lyapunov stability of F and therefore it
must be that gi(θi, F, {Θs}s) ≤ 0 ∀ θi ∈ Θs˜i . Therefore
U i(si, σj) ≥ U i(s˜i, σj) ∀ si : Fi(Θsi) > 0, s˜i : F (Θs˜i) = 0
and I have established that σ is a Nash equilibrium, with
σi(si) = Fi(Θsi) ∀ si ∈ Si and i = 1, 2. 
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We note that the reverse statement, namely that a
Nash equilibrium implies dynamic stability is generally not
true. Consider, for example, a Nash equilibrium involving
strategies that are weakly dominated. It is clear, that for an
open environment of distributions with full support around
the Nash equilibrium distribution there are ideologies that
induce the choice of strategies that gain strictly higher (real)
payoffs than the Nash equilibrium strategies.
Main Theorem
For any game that has a Nash equilibrium σ without
dominant strategies there exists an equilibrium set {Θs}s
with respect to a cdf F such that Fi(Θ
i
s) = σ
i(si) ∀ si ∈ Si
and no θi ∈ Θisi is equivalent to the bias 0 for any si in the
support of σi.
Proof
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium without dominant strate-
gies, for any si there exist strategies (s˜i, sj) such that
U i(si, sj) < U i(s˜i, sj). Define for K > maxs˜i∈Si |U i(s˜i, σj)|
the set Θsi = {θi ∈ Rni·nj |θi(si, sj) ≥ K, θi(s˜i, sj) ≤
−K ∀s˜i 6= si,∀sj}. Since for any θi ∈ Θsi , s˜i 6= si
and sj it holds that U i(si, sj) + θi(si, sj) > 0 and
U i(s˜i, sj) + θi(s˜i, sj) < 0, θi is not equivalent to the origin,
θi0 = 0. Since s
i ∈ arg maxs˜i∈Si U i(s˜i, σj) + θi(s˜i, σj) for
any θi ∈ Θsi and σj ∈ ∆(Sj), it holds that Θsi ⊂ Θsi(σj).
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Set Fi(Θsi) = σ
i(si) ∀ si ∈ Si. Since the density of F is
atomless and the sets Θsi(σ
j),Θsi′(σ
j) overlap only at their
borders, Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) = σi(si) ∀si ∈ Si. The argument holds
for i = 1, 2.5 By definition, {Θs}s is an equilibrium set given
F . 
3.3 Dynamically Stable Sets in 2×2
Games
In the next two sections, we accompany this result by an
illustration for 2× 2 games and for a 3× 3 game.
We normalize an asymmetric 2 × 2-game to a symmteric
game with off-diagonal payoffs of zero (payoffs for player i):
A B
A ai1 + θ
i
a1
ai2 + θ
i
a2
B bi2 + θ
i
b1
bi1 + θ
i
b2
→
A B
A ai + θia 0
B 0 bi + θib
Assume without loss of generality ai > bi. A bias θi is
equivalent to the true payoffs, if the bias does not alter the
sign of the true payoff, that is if sign{ai} = sign{ai + θia}
and sign{bi} = sign{bi + θib}. For any σj ∈ ∆({A,B}),
ΘiA(σ
j) = {θ ∈ R2 | σj(A)(θia + ai) ≥ σj(B)(bi + θib)}
and Fi(Θ
i
A) =
∫
ΘiA(σ
j fi(θ
i)dθi. We can write U i(A, θi) =
ai · Fj(ΘjA) and U i(B, θi) = bi · (1 − Fj(ΘjA)). Therefore
5I suspect that it holds for games with an arbitrary number of pop-
ulations.
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gi(θi, F, {Θs}) can take only two values for any given F
and {Θs}; gi(θi, F, {Θs}) = giA(F, {Θs}) if θi ∈ ΘiA and
gi(θ˜i, F, {Θs}) = giB(F, {Θs}) if θ˜i ∈ ΘiB. This implies
then since F˙i(R2) = giA(F, {Θs}) · Fi(ΘiA) + giB(F, {Θs}) ·
(1 − Fi(ΘiA)) = 0 that giA(F, {Θs}) = 0 if Fi(ΘiA) = 1
and that giB(F, {Θs}) = 0 if Fi(ΘiA) = 0. I conclude that
Fi(Θ
i
A) = 1 and Fi(Θ
i
A) = 0 are restpoints of the dynamic
of population i. If instead Fi(Θ
i
A) ∈ (0, 1), I can substi-
tute giA(F, {Θs}) = −giB(F, {Θs})Fi(Θ
i
A)
Fi(ΘiB)
and the dynamics
simplify for all Θi ∈ B to
F˙i(Θ
i) = giA(F, {Θs})
(
Fi(Θ
i|ΘiA)− Fi(Θi|ΘiB)
)
Fi(Θ
i
A) .
An interior steady state (0 < Fi(Θ
i
A) < 1) has the follow-
ing characteristics: giA(F, {Θs}) = giB(F, {Θs}) = 0 which
implies that U iA(F, {Θs}) = U iB(F, {Θs}) ⇔ Fj(ΘjA) = b
i
ai+bi
,
which can only be in (0, 1) if ai(ai+bi) > 0 and bi(ai+bi) > 0.
To summarize, there always exist four restpoints: {Fi(ΘiA) =
1}i=1,2; {Fi(ΘiA) = 0}i=1,2; {Fi(ΘiA) = 2 − i}i=1,2; {Fi(ΘiA) =
i − 1}i=1,2. Additionally, if ai(ai + bi) > 0 ∧ bi(ai + bi) >
0, i = 1, 2, then {Fi(ΘiA) = b
j
aj+bj
}i=1,2,j 6=i is also a restpoint.
3.3.1 Classification of 2×2 Games
So far, I did not specify the true payoffs of the game,
{ai, bi}2i=1. There exist five qualitative categories to char-
acterize the Nash equilibria of all 2× 2-games.6
6We ignore the cases in which a true payoff equals zero.
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a2 > b2 > 0
a1 > b1 > 0 (A1, A2), (B1, B2), (p1, p2)
a1 > 0 > b1 (A1, A2)
0 > a1 > b1 (p1, p2)
a2 > 0 > b2
a1 > b1 > 0 (A1, A2)
a1 > 0 > b1 (A1, A2)
0 > a1 > b1 (B1, A2)
0 > a2 > b2
a1 > b1 > 0 (p1, p2)
a1 > 0 > b1 (A1, B2)
0 > a1 > b1 (A1, B2), (B1, A2), (p1, p2)
Nash equilibria in nine different cases
(p1, p2) denotes a mixed Nash equilibrium in which a fraction
p1 =
b2
a2+b2
of population 1 and a fraction p2 =
b1
a1+b1
of pop-
ulation 2 choose A. In the next subsections, I explore these
nine cases. In any case, the distribution of play converges to
a Nash equilibrium, which was already observed by Ely and
Yilankaya (2001). In contrast to Ely and Yilankaya (2001),
I do not need to assume that the initial measure of ideolo-
gies has positive mass on payoffs that are equivalent to the
true payoffs. I show that for any parameters a, b there exist
initial measures such that ideologies persist even if they are
not equivalent to the true payoffs.
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(a1 > 0 > b1), (a2 > b2 > 0); (a1 > 0 > b1), (a2 > 0 > b2)
and (a1 > b1 > 0), (a2 > 0 > b2)
(a1 > 0 > b1), (a2 > b2 > 0):
Population 1 has A1 as a dominant strategy, population 2’s
best response to A1 is A2, the unique Nash equilibrium is
(A1, A2). There is no interior rest point, the set of restpoints
consists of the four pure strategy restpoints.
Since from payoff monotonicity I have gA1(F
′,Θ′A) >
gB1(F
′,Θ′A) for any F
′
1(Θ
′
A1
) < 1 and F2, I have that
F ∗1 (Θ
∗
A1
) = 1 is uniquely stable.
For any F ∗· = (F ∗1 , F2), UA2(F
∗·,Θ∗·A) = a2 > 0 =
UB2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) and therefore gA2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) > gB2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) for
any F2(ΘA2) < 1. Hence F
∗
2 (Θ
∗
A2
) = 1 is uniquely stable.
The remaining two cases (a1 > 0 > b1), (a2 > 0 > b2) and
(a1 > b1 > 0), (a2 > 0 > b2) imply the same uniquely stable
restpoint, the argument is the same as above.
(a1 > 0 > b1), (0 > a2 > b2) and (0 > a1 > b1), (a2 > 0 > b2)
(a1 > 0 > b1), (0 > a2 > b2):
Population 1 has A1 as a dominant strategy, population 2’s
best response to A1 is B2, the unique Nash equilibrium is
(A1, B2). There is no interior rest point, the set of restpoints
consists of the four pure strategy restpoints.
Since from payoff monotonicity I have gA1(F
′,Θ′A) >
gB1(F
′,Θ′A) for any F
′
1(Θ
′
A1
) < 1 and F2, I have that
F ∗1 (Θ
∗
A1
) = 1 is uniquely stable.
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For any F ∗· = (F ∗1 , F2), UA2(F
∗·,Θ∗·A) = a2 < 0 =
UB2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) and therefore gA2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) < gB2(F
∗·,Θ∗·) for
any F ∗(∗·) with F2(ΘA2) < 1. Hence F ∗2 (Θ∗A2) = 0 is
uniquely stable.
The case (0 > a1 > b1), (a2 > 0 > b2) is analogous.
(0 > a1 > b1), (0 > a2 > b2)
There are two strict Nash equilibria (A1, B2), (A2, B1) and
one mixed Nash equilibrium (p1, p2) = (
b2
a2+b2
, a1
a1+b1
). The
set of restpoints consists of the four pure restpoints plus the
unique restpoint in which F1(ΘA1) =
b2
a2+b2
and F2(ΘA2) =
b1
a1+b1
.
(0 > a1 > b1), (a2 > b2 > 0) and (a1 > a2 > 0), (0 > a1 >
a2) (matching pennies)
(0 > a1 > b1), (a2 > b2 > 0):
The only Nash equilibrium is the mixed equilibrium
(p1, p2) = (
b2
a2+b2
, b1
a1+b1
), which is a steady state, additionally
to the four pure steady states. UA1(F,ΘA) = a1 · F2(ΘA2),
UB1(F,ΘA) = b1·(1−F2(ΘA2)), from payoff monotonicity fol-
lows gA1(F,ΘA) > gB1(F,ΘA) ⇔ F2(ΘA2) < b1a1+b1 . For pop-
ulation 2 I have UA2(F,ΘA) = a2 ·F1(ΘA1), UB2(F,ΘA) = b2 ·
(1−F1(ΘA1)), from payoff monotonicity follows gA2(F,ΘA) >
gB2(F,ΘA) ⇔ F1(ΘA1) > b2a2+b2 . Therefore a pure steady
state cannot be Lyapunov stable. The mixed steady state is
Lyapunov stable if F˙ (Θ) is the above mentioned replicator
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dynamic, however it is not Lyapunov stable for all payoff
monotonic dynamics.
The case (a1 > b1 > 0), (0 > a2 > b2) is analogous.
(a1 > b1 > 0), (a2 > b2 > 0) (coordination games)
This class of games has three Nash equilibria, two in pure
strategies (A1, A2), (B1, B2) and one in mixed strategies
(p1, p2) = (
b1
a1+b1
, b2
a2+b2
). From UA1(F,ΘA) = a1 · F2(ΘA2),
UB1(F,ΘA) = b1 · (1 − F2(ΘA2)) and payoff monotonicity it
follows gA1(F,ΘA) > gB1(F,ΘA) ⇔ F2(ΘA1) > b1a1+b1 , for
population 2 analogously. Therefore, only the strict Nash
equilibria are Lyapunov stable.
3.4 Conclusions
We study a model in which strategically interacting agents
follow an ideology that specifies the unobservable payoffs of
a symmetric 2×2-game. When drawn from an infinite popu-
lation, an agent knows his own ideology, but has incomplete
information of the ideology that his opponent follows. I as-
sume that the distribution of ideologies within the popula-
tion is common knowledge. I allow for a continuous variety
of ideologies that each specifies payoffs for games which can
be of any class of symmetric 2× 2-games. Given any distri-
bution of ideologies, I define equilibrium sets and show the
existence thereof. I assume that agents coordinate on such
an equilibrium set. My results do not depend upon the se-
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lection of such an equilibrium set in the case of multiplicity.
My focus is on the dynamics of ideologies. I assume that
evolution selects against ideologies that induce behaviour
which yields relatively low evolutionary relevant true pay-
offs. I characterize distributions that are stable with respect
to small changes (Lyapunov stability). My main result is
that for any two player game with a Nash equilibrium with-
out dominant strategies, there exists equilbrium sets that
consist only of non-equivalent ideologies. For any generic
2 × 2-game there exist stable distributions putting positive
mass only on those ideologies that represent preferences not
equivalent to preferences represented by the true payoffs. I
provide an example of 3×3-games that confirms this result.
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Appendix A
Proposition 1
Let g be convex monotonic. If F ⊂ ∆R is a Lyapunov stable
set of rest points, then each ρ ∈ F is a c.e. .
Proof: Since ρ ∈ F is a restpoint, gi(ri, ρ) =
0 ∀ ri ∈ supp (ρi). Suppose ∃ril , rik ∈ supp(ρi) such
that F i(ril , ρ−i) > F i(rik, ρ−i). Then, by convex mono-
tonicity, gi(rik, ρ) < g
i(ril , ρ) · 1, a contradiction. Therefore
F i(ril , ρ−i) = F i(rik, ρ−i) ∀ ril , rik ∈ supp(ρi). If ρ is in the
interior of F with respect to ∆R, I are done. Suppose
instead that for some i there exists rik 6∈ supp(ρi) and
suppose that F i(rik, ρ−i) > F i(ρ). Then, again by convex
monotonicity, gi(rik, ρ) >
∑
ri∈Ri g
i(ri, ρ) · ρi(ri) = 0. Since
g is (Lipschitz–)continuous, there exists a neighborhood
U of ρ such that gi(rik, ρ˜) > 0 ∀ ρ˜ ∈ U ∩ ∆R. Define
U ′ = {ρ˜ ∈ U ∩ ∆R | ρ˜i(rik) > 0}. It holds that ρˆirik(t, ρ˜) is
strictly increasing in t for any ρ˜ ∈ U ′. However, Lyapunov
stability implies that ρˆ(t, ρ˜) ∈ U ′ ∀ t ≥ 0 and ρ˜ ∈ U ′′
for some neighborhood U ′′, which can only be the case if
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˙˜ρi(rik) ≤ 0 for some ρ˜ ∈ U ′, because ρi(rik) = 0. Since
gi(rik, ρ˜) > 0 ∀ ρ˜ ∈ U ′ this is not true for any subset of U ′
and U ′′ does not exist. Therefore, the existence of some
rik ∈ Ri for some i ∈ N such that F i(rik, ρ−i) > F i(ρ)
contradicts Lyapunov stability of F and I have established
the claim. 
Proposition 3
Let (2.1) be convex monotonic. If a set F is a SEset, then
F is an asymptotically stable set of rest points.
Proof: Suppose F is an SEset and suppose that F 6= ∆R.
Each point in F is a restpoint of (2.1). Further I have
that F is a finite union of faces of ∆R and therefore is
closed. Consider some ρ∗ on the boundary of F with respect
to ∆R. For some population there is a pure rule ri such
that F i(ri, ρ−i∗ ) < F i(ρ∗). Since gi(·, ρ) · ρi = 0 ∀ ρ ∈ ∆R
it follows that gi(ri, ρ∗) = 0 ∀ ri ∈ supp(ρi∗). From
convex monotonicity I have that gi(ri, ρ∗) < 0 ∀ ri 6∈
supp(ρi∗) and from continuity follows that there exists
some neighborhood U : U ∩ int(∆R) 6= ∅ of ρ∗ such
that gi(ri, ρ) < 0 ∀ ri 6∈ supp(ρi∗), ρ ∈ U . Therefore
ρ˙iri(ρ) < 0 ∀ri 6∈ supp(ρi∗),∀ ρ ∈ U \ F and from
gi(·, ρ) · ρi = 0 I have for at least one ri ∈ supp(ρi∗) that
ρ˙iri(ρ) > 0 ∀ ρ ∈ U \ F , which establishes the result. 
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Appendix B
Row’s expected payoffs in the expansion of the Chicken
game
ll rl
uu 6 6− 4P (ω1)
ud 6 + P (ω3) 6− 4P (ω1) + P (ω3)
du 7− P (ω3) 7− 7P (ω1)− P (ω3)
dd 7 7− 7P (ω1)
lr rr
uu 2 + 4P (ω1) 2
ud 2 + 4P (ω1)− 2P (ω3) 2(1− P (ω3))
du 7P (ω1) + 2P (ω3) 2P (ω3)
dd 7P (ω1) 0
Column’s expected payoffs in the expansion of the Chicken
game
ll rl
uu 6 6 + P (ω1)
ud 6− 4P (ω3) 6− 4P (ω1) + P (ω3)
du 2 + 4P (ω3) 2− 2P (ω1) + 4P (ω3)
dd 2 2(1− P (ω1))
lr rr
uu 7− P (ω1) 7
ud 7− P (ω1)− 7P (ω3) 7− 7P (ω3)
du 2P (ω1) + 7P (ω3) 7P (ω3)
dd 2P (ω1) 0
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Best replies for P with full support:
BR1(ll) ≡ dd , BR1(rr) = uu
BR1(rl) =

ud , if 3P (ω1) + P (ω3) > 1
{ud, dd} , if 3P (ω1) + P (ω3) = 1
dd , if 3P (ω1) + P (ω3) < 1
BR1(lr) =

uu , if 3P (ω1) + 2P (ω3) < 2
{uu, du} , if 3P (ω1) + 2P (ω3) = 2
du , if 3P (ω1) + 2P (ω3) > 2
BR2(uu) ≡ rr , BR2(dd) = ll
BR2(ud) =

rl , if 3P (ω3) + P (ω1) > 1
{rl, rr} , if 3P (ω3) + P (ω1) = 1
rr , if 3P (ω3) + P (ω1) < 1
BR2(du) =

ll , if 2P (ω1) + 3P (ω3) < 2
{ll, lr} , if 2P (ω1) + 3P (ω3) = 2
lr , if 2P (ω1) + 3P (ω3) > 2
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Appendix C
Lemma Fi(Θsi(σ
j)) is continuous in σj ∀ i, j.
Proof:
Outline:
Given a convergent sequence {σn}n in ∆(Sj) and as-
sociated halfspaces {Hn}n we show Hn ∪ H ↓ H and
Hn ∩ H ↑ H and prove with Lemmata C1 & C2 continuity
from below and above. We define Hn such that Θsi(σ
j) is
the intersection of finitely many halfspaces and therefore is
also continuous from above and below.
For any σ, σˆ ∈ ∆(Sj) define σn = σ n−1n + σˆ 1n , n ∈ N.
For any si, s˜i ∈ Si and σn ∈ ∆(Sj) define Hn = {θi ∈
Rni·nj |Ui(si, σn) + θi(si, σn) ≥ Ui(s˜i, σn) + θi(s˜i, σn)}, the
set of types that weakly prefer strategy si over strategy s˜i
given belief σn.
7
Hn ∩H ↑ H:
We show θi ∈ Hn ∩ H ⇒ θi ∈ Hn+1. Multiplying the
inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn with nn+1 , the inequality
7The proofs for s˜i = si are trivially valid, however, only the cases
s˜i 6= si are relevant.
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implied by θi ∈ H with 1
n+1
and summing up yields
Ui(s
i, σn
n
n + 1
+ σ
1
n + 1
) + θi(si, σn
n
n + 1
+ σ
1
n + 1
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn n
n + 1
+ σ
1
n + 1
) + θi(s˜i, σn
n
n + 1
+ σ
1
n + 1
)
⇔ Ui(si, σn+1) + θi(si, σn+1) ≥ Ui(s˜i, σn+1) + θi(s˜i, σn+1) ,
which implies θi ∈ Hn+1. θi ∈ H is trivially implied, we
conclude Hn+1 ∩H ⊂ Hn ∩H ∀ n ∈ N. Since H ∩H = H,
we have shown Hn ∩H ↑ H.
Hn ∪H ↓ H:
We start by showing θi ∈ Hn+1 ∩H1 ⇒ θ ∈ Hn. Multiplying
the inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn+1 with n2−1n2 , the inequality
implied by θi ∈ H1 with 1n2 and summing up yields
Ui(s
i, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
) + θi(si, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn+1n
2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
) + θi(s˜i, σn+1
n2 − 1
n2
+ σˆ
1
n2
)
⇔
Ui(s
i, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) + θi(si, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
)
≥ Ui(s˜i, σn− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) + θi(s˜i, σ
n− 1
n
+ σˆ
1
n
) ,
which implies θi ∈ Hn. We conclude θi ∈ Hn+1 \Hn ⇒ θi 6∈
H1.
We proceed by showing θi ∈ Hn+1 \Hn ⇒ θi ∈ H.
Multiplying the inequality implied by θi ∈ Hn+1 with n2−1n2
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and adding the inequality implied by θi 6∈ Hn yields
Ui(s
i, σ) + θi(si, σ)− Ui(s˜i, σ)− θi(s˜i, σ)
>
2n
n + 1
[
Ui(s˜
i, σˆ) + θi(s˜i, σˆ)− Ui(si, σˆ)− θi(si, σˆ)
]
As we have shown above, θi 6∈ H1 and therefore the right
hand side of the inequality is positive. Therefore θi ∈ H.
Since Hn+1 = (Hn+1\Hn)∪(Hn+1∩Hn) we conclude Hn+1 ⊂
Hn∪H ∀ n ∈ N. As H∪H = H, we have shown Hn∪H ↓ H.
We apply Lemmata C1 & C2 below with An = Hn∩H and
Bn = Hn ∪H and conlude that F is continuous from above
and below. From the definition of H, Θsi(σ
j) = ∩s˜i∈SiH s˜in
is a finite intersection and the desired properties of F carry
over for Θsi(σ
j). 
Lemmata C1 & C2 are taken from and proved in Bauer
(1992).
Lemma C1 (continuity from below)
Consider a sequence {An}n of subsets of Rni·nj with
An ↑ A ⊂ Rni·nj .
Then limn→∞ F (An) = F (A).
Proof:
Define A0 := ∅ and an := An \ An−1, n ∈ N. We have
An = ∪ni=1ai and A = ∪∞n=1an. Since an ∩ am = ∅ ∀n 6= m
and σ−additivity of the measure F we have
F (A) =
∞∑
n=1
F (an) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
F (ai) = lim
n→∞
F (An) . 
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Lemma C2 (continuity from above)
Consider a sequence {Bn}n of subsets of Rni·nj with
Bn ↓ B ⊂ Rni·nj .
Then limn→∞ F (Bn) = F (B).
Proof:
Since Bn ⊂ B1 ∀ n ∈ N it holds that F (B1 \ Bn) =
F (B1) − F (Bn) ∀ n ∈ N. Clearly, B1 \ Bn ↑ B1 \ B. From
Lemma C1 we know that F (B1 \ B) = limn→∞ F (B1 \ Bn)
and therefore F (B1 \B) = F (B1)− limn→∞ F (Bn). We also
have B ⊂ B1 and therefore F (B1 \ B) = F (B1) − F (B),
which establishes F (B) = limn→∞ F (Bn). 
Remarks
Symmetric difference A	B = A \B ∪B \ A:
Note since we do not require F (Θ) > 0 ∀Θ ⊂ Rni·nj ,
F (A 	 B) = 0 does not imply A = B. Therefore
dF (A,B) = F (A 	 B) is only a pseudo metric (satisfying
symmetry and the triangle inequality).
Upper hemi continuity:
Note further that Θ(σ) is not upper hemi continuous.
To give an example, consider the doubly symmetric 2×2
coordination game:
sj1 s
j
2
si1 (1,1) (0,0)
si2 (0,0) (1,1)
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Then each θi ∈ Θsi1
(
1
3
)
satisfies
[1 + θi(si1, s
j
1)]
1
3
+ θi(si1, s
j
2)
2
3
≥ θi(si2, sj1)
1
3
+ [1 + θi(si2, s
j
2)]
2
3
Define E as the set of θi that satisfy
[1+θi(si1, s
j
1)]
1
3
+θi(si1, s
j
2)
2
3
> θi(si2, s
j
1)
1
3
+[1+θi(si2, s
j
2)]
2
3
−1
Clearly, Θsi1
(
1
3
) ⊂ E. Consider some σˆj(sj1) arbitrarily close
to 1
3
, for example σˆj(sj1) =
1
3
+  for  ∈ (0, 2
3
). Any θi ∈
Θsi(σˆ
j) satisfies
[1 + θi(si1, s
j
1)](
1
3
+ ) + θi(si1, s
j
2)(
2
3
− )
≥
θi(si2, s
j
1)(
1
3
+ ) + [1 + θi(si2, s
j
2)](
2
3
− ) .
The reader can verify that θi = (θi(si1, s
j
1), . . . , θ
i(si2, s
j
2)) =(
21−3
3
, 0, 0, 1
3
)
does belong to Θsi(σˆ
j) but not to E. There-
fore, Θsi(·) is not upper hemi continuous.
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